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Any man of energy and initiative in this country can get what he wants out of life. 
But when initiative is crippled by legislation or by a tax system which denies him 
the right to receive a reasonable share of his earnings, then he will no longer exert 
himself and the country will be deprived of the energy on which its continued 
greatness depends. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
A "society's choice of a system of taxation speaks volumes about 
what that society values and believes."3 While the United States should be 
applauded for having enacted anti-discrimination statutes, a hole in Ameri-
can tax law leaves the overarching goal of these statutes unfulfilled. Current 
2. AMITY SHLAES, THE FORGOTIEN MAN: A NEW HISTORY OF THE GREAT 
DEPRESSION 33-34 (2007) (quoting Andrew Mellon, the American banker, industrialist, and 
former Secretary of the Treasury). 
3. Sharon C. Nantell, A Cultural Perspective on American Tax Policy, 2 CHAP. L. 
REV. 33, 35 (1999) (footnote omitted). This connection betWeen tax law and a society's 
values repeats itself within scholarly circles: 
Every society makes choices as to the tax systems that not only raise the necessary 
revenues to support government expenditures, but within that choice are inherent 
reflections of societal values. Not only does a society choose a tax system but the 
tax system becomes one of the basic institutions that in itself shapes and molds the 
society. 
KEVIN E. MURPHY ET. AL., CONCEPTS IN FEDERAL TAXATION 1 (2011) (quoting Karen M. 
Yeager). Tax policy helps determine a country's "national fabric." Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 
509, 515 (1899); see also J. MARTIN BURKE & MICHAEL K. FRIEL, TAXATION OF INDIVIDUAL 
INCOME 4 (9th ed. 201 0) ("Congress uses the federal income tax as a tool of social policy."); 
JEFFERY L. YABLON, As CERTAIN AS DEATH: QUOTATIONS ABOUT TAXES 28 (2010) (quoting 
former senator Bill Bradley, who said, "Tax reform is ... a decision about values"). Unlike 
the laws of nature, tax is a purely human creation: 
The design of a tax system ... reflects the values of its designers. Tax systems, af-
ter all, do not follow the laws of nature. The design of a tax system is not ordained 
by anything even remotely analogous to the law of gravity. Unlike the falling of a 
pebble released from a hand, a particular tax system is not the inevitable result of 
forces which humans can understand, perhaps control and sometimes escape from, 
but cannot alter. Rather, tax systems are products of human creation. They exist 
because they serve human objectives, reflecting the values of their designers. A tax 
system's design can reveal much about those values. 
!d. at 84 (quoting recognized tax professor Alice G. Abreu). 
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law, most notably Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI1),4 the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),5 and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA),6 confers courts with broad equitable powers to ef-
fectuate the desires of Congress. 7 Although these provisions differ in origin, 
they nonetheless "share common substantive features and also ... common 
purpose[s]: 8 'the elimination of discrimination in the workplace"'9 and the 
restoration of an employee to "'the economic status quo'" he would have 
enjoyed, absent the employer's illegal behavior. 10 Unfortunately, this at-
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination by employers "against 
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment" on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national citizenship in industries affecting 
·interstate commerce). 
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006) (forbidding employment discrimination against 
anyone over the age of forty years old). 
6. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, I 04 Stat. 327 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006)). Congress passed the Act be-
cause "discrimination against individuals ... persist[ed] in such critical areas as employ-
ment." /d. at§ 12101(a)(3). According to the ADA, an employment agency or labor organi-
zation cannot discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability when hiring, train-
ing, advancing, or discharging an employee. /d. § 12112(a). 
7. See infra Section III.B (elaborating on the wide latitude Congress has vested in 
federal courts to eradicate discrimination in the United States). For a definition of"unlawful 
discrimination"-and appropriate synonyms-as this Note will use the term, see I.R.C. § 
62(e) (2006) (including Title VII, the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, the Nation-
al Labor Relations Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, the ADEA, the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Title IX of the Educa-
tion Amendments of 1972, the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, the Worker 
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, the 
ADA, and the Fair Housing Act). Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA will be discussed ex-
clusively. However,§ 62(e)(l8) makes the scope of employment dispute claims quite vast: 
!d. 
Any provision of Federal, State, or local law, or common law claims permitted un-
der Federal, State, or locallaw-(i) providing for the enforcement of civil rights, or 
(ii) regulating any aspect of the employment relationship, including claims for 
wages, compensation, or benefits, or prohibiting the discharge of an employee, the 
discrimination against an employee, or any other form of retaliation or reprisal 
against an employee for asserting rights or taking other actions permitted by law. 
8. The differences between Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA are inconsequential 
for purposes of this Note. See Dashnaw v. Pefia, 12 F.3d 1112, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (per 
curiam) (substituting Title VII for ADEA case law in analyzing a constructive discharge 
suit). 
9. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995) (quoting 
Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750,756 (1979)). 
10. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 769 (1976) (quoting NLRB v. 
Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258,263 (1969)); see also Taxman v. Bd. ofEduc., 91 F.3d 
1547, 1565-66 (3d Cir. 1996) (en bane) (asserting that courts should grant an award that 
"most closely approximates the conditions that would have prevailed in the absence of dis-
crimination"); O'Neill v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 108 F. Supp. 2d 443, 447 (E.D. Pa. 2000) 
("The goal ... is to allow [the] plaintiff to keep the same amount of money as if he had not 
been unlawfully terminated."). -
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tempt at justice falls blatantly short every year when the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) collects taxes from prevailing plaintiffs in employment dis-
putes. In extreme cases, the employee may actually be left poorer, after tax-
es, than before the award. 11 Thus, a plaintiffs "adverse" tax consequences 
suggest, even if unintentionally, that Congress and federal courts do not 
"deem[] [the integrity of civil rights and employment law] worth protect-
ing."l2 
Damages in wrongful discharge suits can come in a variety of forms: 13 
lost wages, 14 emotional distress damages, 15 compensation for medical ex-
penses and physical injuries, 16 punitive damages, 17 and attorneys' fees. 18 The 
first category, broken up into payment for wages already lost (back pay) 19 
11. See Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399, 425-26 (2000) (Beghe, J., dissenting) 
(noting that if the ratio of attorneys' fees to gross settlement amount is large enough, a pre-
tax gain could be transmuted into an after-tax loss because the employee may be subject to a 
rate of tax in excess of 100%); Adam Liptak, Tax Bill Exceeds Award to Officer in Sex Bias 
Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2002, at AI& (telling the story of a plaintiff who ended up with a 
$99,000 loss, despite obtaining a $1,250,000 judgment in her favor); see also infra Subsec-
tions 1.8.2, II.C.2 (offering more hypothetical and real-life examples of how a plaintiffs 
legal fees can transform a post-judgment recovery into a net loss). In 2004, Congress amend-
ed the Code to fix this problem, but a loophole for ancillary claims may still exist. See infra 
Subsection I.B.2 (emphasizing that the AMT trap, the name given to this predicament, con-
tinues to pose a problem, at least in demonstrating the reluctance of judges to provide gross 
ups). 
12. Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children, and 
the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263, 1279 (2004). 
13. See, e.g., 110 CoNG. REc. 6549 (daily ed. March 30, 1964) (statement of Sen. 
Humphrey) (outlining the types of equitable relief available to plaintiffs in Title VII claims). 
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(l) (2006) (courts may award back pay when an 
employer intentionally engages in an unlawful employment practice). 
15. See id. § 1981a(b)(2)-(3) (defining compensatory damages as "future pecuniary 
losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, 
and other nonpecuniary losses," but not back pay). 
16. Seeid. 
17. See id. § 1981a(b)(I) (allowing for punitive damages when the employer acts 
"with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved 
individual"); Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 535 (1999) ("[Section 1981a] does 
not require a showing of egregious or outrageous discrimination independent of the employ-
er's state of mind."). 
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2006) (providing that a successful plaintiff can seek 
reasonable attorneys' fees under Title VII); id. at § 12117(a) (adopting the remedies of Title 
VII for the ADA); 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2006) (recognizing attorneys' fees in ADEA dis-
putes). However, the attorney fee portion of an award must be included in gross income and, 
thus, could invoke the AMT trap. See discussion infra Subsection 1.8.2 (introducing the 
alternative minimum tax and arguing that the AMT trap continues to cast a shadow over 
employment recoveries); Campbell v. Comm'r, 274 F.3d 1312, 1314 (lOth Cir. 2001) (hold-
ing that a prevailing employee must account for attorneys' fees in gross income); Young v. 
Comm'r, 240 F.3d 369,377-78 (4th Cir. 2001) (same). 
19. See Civil Rights Tax Relief Act of 2009, H.R. 3035, I lith Cong. § 3 (2009) 
(characterizing "back pay" as compensation for "services performed, or that would have 
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and payment for wages deprived of in the future (front pay)/0 usually makes 
up the largest percentage of a successful plaintiff's award.21 Because "com-
pensation for services" falls within the definition of "gross income," as pro-
vided by the Internal Revenue Code (Code)/2 no one questions the federal 
government's ability to tax these amounts.23 Therefore, unless the claim 
arises from a personal, physical injury, an employee's entire judgment 
should generally24 be taxed as ordinary income.25 However, the timing of 
been performed but for a claimed violation of law, as an employee, former employee, or 
prospective employee before such taxable year for the taxpayer's employer, former employ-
er, or prospective employer"); see also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416-17 
(1975) (finding that compensation for wages lost prior to judgment may be recovered, as 
long as the remedy is equitable). Due to the time value of money, courts typically include an 
interest component in the back-pay award; see, e.g., Skalka v. Fernald Envtl. Restoration 
Mgmt. Corp., 178 F.3d 414, 428-29 (6th Cir. 1999) (recognizing the interest plaintiff could 
have earned if he had the opportunity to invest the wages in due course); EEOC v. Ky. State 
Police Dep't, 80 F.3d 1086, 1097-98 (6th Cir. 1996) (same, but limited to pre-judgment 
interest). For discussion on how a plaintiffs pre-judgment interest can be analogized to his 
negative tax consequences, see infra Sections II.B, III.C. 
20. Front pay compensates the plaintiff for future wage loss because of unemploy-
ment or under-employment. Susan K. Grebeldinger, The Role of Workplace Hostility in 
Determining Prospective Remedies for Employment Discrimination: A Call for Greater 
Judicial Discretion in Awarding Front Pay, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 319, 327-28; see also 
Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 82 F.3d 615, 622 (5th Cir. 1996) (indicating that district 
courts may grant front pay, but the award should be reduced to present value). 
21. See Mark J. Tindall, How Much Is an Illegal Immigrant's Life Worth?, 89 TEX. 
L. REV. 729, 730 (stating that in wrongful-death suits, "[b]y far the largest percentage of 
damages comes from pecuniary losses, which mainly consist of the decedent's lost earning 
capacity") (footnote omitted). 
22. I.R.C. § 61(a)(l) (2006). 
23. See id. at § 6l(a) (describing how "gross income" can come "from whatever 
source derived," which includes wages). "Income" is any "accession[) to wealth, clearly 
realized, and over which" a taxpayer has control. Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 
426, 431 (1955); see also Comm'r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 327 (1995) (emphasizing that 
the Code's definition of"gross income" has a "sweeping scope"). 
24. See I.R.C. § 213 (2006) (stating medical bills do not get taxed either); id. at 
§ 104(a) (allowing a deduction for medical care expenses not compensated by insurance). 
25. See id. at§ 104(a)(2) (excluding from gross income damages other than punitive 
damages "on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness"). Congress amended 
the Code in 1996 after two Supreme Court cases held that the personal injury exclusion could 
not be applied to back pay. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. I 04-188, 
§ 1605(a), 110 Stat. 1755, 1838-39; United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 233-37 (1992) 
(applying the exclusion only if the victim has suffered a tort-type personal injury); Schleier, 
515 U.S. at 333-37 (ruling that the exclusion applies only if damages compensate for an 
injury to physical or mental health or bear a close nexus to the personal injury). With the 
Supreme Court in Burke "focusing on the remedial scheme of the underlying statutory cause 
of action," Congress immediately stepped in to correct the Court and give Title VII a broader 
scope. BURKE & FRIEL, supra note 3, at 187. Presently, only damages "flowing from a non-
physical personal injury," which "include[) physical symptoms of [a] nonphysical injury, as 
well as any economic damages," should be taxed. Laura Spitz, I Think, Therefore I Am; I 
Feel, Therefore I Am Taxed: Descartes, Tort Reform, and the Civil Rights Tax Relief Act, 35 
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any such payouts can directly affect the plaintiffs tax burden and overall 
recovery. 26 This phenomenon occurs because of the lump-sum nature of a 
jury verdict or settlement. One possible solution to this problem is "grossing 
up," a process in which the court augments an award to account for the extra 
taxes that a recipient will owe.27 Normally, an employee will receive his 
wages over a span of years and, thus, spread out his tax liability. In an em-
ployment discrimination or wrongful termination suit, though, a victorious 
plaintiff will be responsible for paying taxes on the whole award-all at one 
time.28 
Transferring funds in this way often pushes the employee into a high-
er-than-normal tax bracket/9 which, reminiscent of causation in tort actions, 
would not have occurred but for the employer's unlawful conduct. Despite 
this seemingly upfair and onerous result, modern courts have been reluctant 
to provide a "gross up," and in so refusing, have forced plaintiffs to cover 
the additional costs that defendant's breach itself caused.30 Although the 
resolution of this issue can have drastic effects on litigants,31 few judges, 
legal scholars, or practitioners have addressed the problem.32 Recently, the 
N.M. L. REV. 429, 433 & n.30 (2005). This Note will assume that the initial injury is non-
physical, making an origin-of-the-claim argument immaterial. 
26. "Overall recovery," as this Note defines it, refers to the plaintiff's recovery after 
paying attorneys' fees and taxes. 
27. Dan Markel, Overcoming Tradeoffs in the Taxation of Punitive Damages, 88 
VVASH.U.L.REv.609,620. 
28. See Advocacy: Civil Rights Tax Relief Act, NELA, http://www.nela.org/NELA 
/index.cfm?event=showPage&pg=CRTRA (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) ("Under current law, 
employees who do not have to sue for lost wages pay taxes at the marginal rates applicable to 
their actual wages earned in each year; employees who do have to sue for lost wages pay 
taxes at the unduly high marginal rates applicable to the lump sum they receive all in one 
year, even though that sum substitutes for wages earned over a number of years.") 
29. A tax "bracket" is one of the rates (10%, 15%, 25%, 28%, 33%, 35%) found in 
I.R.C. § I that is applied to a given range of income. BURKE & FRIEL, supra note 3, at 17-18; 
see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1187 (7th ed. 2000) (defining "tax bracket" as "[a] cate-
gorized level of income subject to a particular tax rate under federal or state law"). 
30. See Dashnaw v. Pefia, 12 F.3d 1112, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (deny-
ing a gross up because of "the complete lack of support in existing case law for" such relief); 
Fogg v. Gonzalez, 492 F.3d 447 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (refusing to overturn Dashnaw); see also 
infra Subsection II.C.2 (explaining Dashnaw and Fogg in more detail and listing other cases 
that reject a gross up). 
31. VVhile this Note focuses on the parties' negative tax consequences, trial attorneys 
can also suffer "adverse consequences." For information on the ethical and fiduciary duties 
the AMT trap may impose on lawyers (and the resulting sanctions and exposure to malprac-
tice in the event of breach), see Gregg D. Polsky, The Contingent Attorney's Fee Tax Trap: 
Ethical, Fiduciary Duty, and Malpractice Implications, 23 VA. TAX REV. 615 (2004); see 
also Jalali v. Root, I Cal. Rptr. 3d 689, 692 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (awarding plaintiff 
$310,000 in malpractice damages at the trial court level because attorney forgot about the 
AMT and thus, gave erroneous tax advice). 
32. Gregg D. Polsky & Stephen F. Befort, Employment Discrimination Remedies 
and Tax Gross Ups, 90 IOWA L. REV. 67, 69 (2004); Tim Canney, Comment, Tax Gross-ups: 
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Third Circuit deviated from this trend in Eshelman v. Agere Systems, Inc., 
granting a plaintiff over $6,000 to neutralize "adverse" federal tax conse-
quences.33 
As of the October 2011 Term, the United States Supreme Court has 
not ruled definitively on gross ups or offered any input on how lower courts 
should approach this conundrum.34 Based on the circuit split and wide disa-
greement among courts, the issue would seem ripe for adjudication.35 How-
ever, employers and employees cannot wait any longer for the "perfect" 
case. In the absence of Supreme Court guidance, Congress should step up 
now and pass an enhanced version of the Civil Rights Tax Relief Act, a bill 
that has been introduced several times in the Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives.36 Looked at reasonably, a successful plaintiffs argument cannot 
be viewed as anything but logical: to subject him to higher tax rates than 
would have otherwise been applied only adds insult to injury-an injury 
already proven in a judicial proceeding beyond a preponderance of a 
doubt.37 
A Practical Guide to Arguing and Calculating Awards for Adverse Tax Consequences in 
Discrimination Suits, 59 CATH. U. L. REv. I III, 1112 (2010) (commenting on "the relatively 
vague and sparse discussion of tax gross-up awards"). 
33. 554 F.3d 426, 442-43 (3d Cir. 2009). See irifra Sections II.A, II.B for a complete 
summary of Eshelman's facts and holding. 
34. Defendants did not file a writ of certiorari in Eshelman. 
35. See infra Part II (citing cases from United States district courts and courts of 
appeals that diverge over the proper treatment of a plaintiff's adverse tax consequences). 
36. The bill first appeared during the 106th Congress in 1999 (entitled the Civil 
Rights Tax Fairness Act), and very similar provisions have been presented in subsequent 
sessions, including the years 2000,2001,2003,2007, and 2009. H.R. 3035: Civil Rights Tax 
Relief Act of 2009, GovTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hlll-3035 
(last visited Feb. II, 2011) (follow "Related Legislation" hyperlink) [hereinafter GovTRACK 
H.R. 3035]. Sessions of Congress last two years. At the end of each session, all proposed 
bills and resolutions that have not passed are cleared from the books. Supporters, therefore, 
often re-introduce bills that do not become law under a new number in the next session. 
President George W. Bush signed the Civil Rights Tax Relief Act of 2004 into law in Octo-
ber 2004, but this particular bill was far less comprehensive than others. American Jobs 
Creation Act of2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (2004); see also Spitz, supra note 
25, at 446 ("Although the Act [of 2004] bears the same name as earlier proposals, it is obvi-
ously nowhere near as extensive and should not be confused with earlier versions."). For 
more history on the Civil Rights Tax Relief Act, see irifra Section IV.B. Very late in the 
publication process, Representative John Lewis introduced the Civil Rights Tax Relief Act of 
20 II to the I 12th Congress. H.R. 3195: Civil Rights Tax Relief Act of 2011, GOvTRACK.US, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h 112-3195 (last visited Jan. I 0, 20 12). While 
still pending, the bill has little chance of even being reported by the Committee on Ways and 
Means, let alone voted on and signed. 
37. This Note will avoid commenting on the merits of the plaintiff-employee's case 
and, suffice it to say, will assume that the plaintiff has adequately convinced a trier of fact of 
the employer's wrongdoing. 
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This Note considers whether a prevailing plaintiff in an employment 
discrimination or wrongful termination suit should receive an augmented 
award to balance out the extra taxes a lump sum creates. It also proposes a 
solution and urges Congress to respond accordingly. Part I defines pertinent 
terms, lays the groundwork for understanding how tax issues intersect with 
employment law, and describes the negative tax consequences that may 
impact plaintiffs. Part II presents a thorough analysis of the Eshelman deci-
sion and compares the Third Circuit's findings to the handful of other rul-
ings on point. Part III argues that, in the spirit of anti-discrimination stat-
utes, plaintiffs should be able to request payments that will offset increased 
tax liabilities. Moreover, Part III asserts that courts do have the authority to 
provide gross ups. Part IV details the uncertainty that pervades employment 
suits with regard to how taxes should be treated, as well as the great reluc-
tance of many courts to resolve the matter adequately. Finally, this Note 
recommends that Congress breathe life back into the Civil Rights Tax Relief 
Act and, ultimately, pass Part IV's version of it. As courts struggle to reach 
a satisfactory approach to an employee's right to tax relief, Congress should 
guarantee that America's "national policy of encouraging the pursuit of 
meritorious civil rights claims" does not become diluted.38 
I. BACKGROUND 
This section explores some basic elements of tax law and attempts to 
demonstrate the significant ramifications "adverse" tax consequences can 
have for a plaintiff-employee. It explains the alternative minimum tax 
{AMT), a system designed, in theory, to ensure that wealthy members of 
society "pay more than a minimal amount of income tax. "39 In addition, Part 
I juxtaposes the AMT with the regular tax regime and works through two 
numerical examples highlighting the monetary losses an average American 
worker may experience-depending on the availability of attorneys' fees 
and whether those fees cover a primary employment claim or an auxiliary 
one-in both situations. In this Note, the terms "adverse" and "negative" tax 
consequences will be used interchangeably and will refer to the amount by 
which (i) the after-tax dollars recovered by the plaintiff for pecuniary dam-
ages is less than (ii) the after-tax dollars the plaintiff would have received 
38. Laura Sager & Stephen Cohen, How the Income Tax Undermines Civil Rights 
Law, 73 S. CAL. L. REv. 1075, 1078 (2000) (footnote omitted). 
39. Polsky & Befort, supra note 32, at 69 n.3; see also First Chi. Corp. v. Comm'r, 
842 F.2d 180, 181 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Congress enacted the [alternative] minimum tax to pre-
vent corporate and individual taxpayers from aggregating deductions to the point where they 
pay ... no tax .... "). 
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had no discrimination occurred and the plaintiff had earned his wages in due 
course.40 
A. Definitions Related to Income Taxation 
In 1913, the United States ratified the Sixteenth Amendment, which 
allows Congress to levy income taxes: "The Congress shall have power to 
lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without 
apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census 
or enumeration."41 For decades, the IRS has utilized two constant features 
(or conventions). First, the government calculates a taxpayer's income 
based on any gains he actually or constructively receives during the calen-
dar year in question.42 This concept is known as "annual accounting."43 Se-
cond, the United States employs a progressive income tax structure, which 
means that the marginal tax rate increases as the base amount of taxable 
income increases.44 The "tax rate" is the ratio--usually expressed as a per-
centage-at which the IRS taxes a business or individual.45 Tax rates are 
most commonly classified as either marginal or effective. The ''marginal" 
tax rate signifies the change in one's tax obligation as income rises and is 
the tax rate that applies to the last dollar of the tax base.46 The "tax base" is 
the amount of taxable income.47 For instance, the marginal tax rate for an 
unmarried individual with taxable income of $100,000 would be 28% in 
40. Polsky & Befort, supra note 32, at 73. 
41. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
42. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-J(c)(J)(i) (2006); Rev. Rul. 78-336, 1978-2 C.B. 256 (ruling 
that dismissed federal employees must report income for back pay in the year paid); see also 
United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200,219 (2001) (applying income 
taxes to back pay for the year the settlement was paid, not the years the wages should have 
been paid). 
43. Polsky & Befort, supra note 32, at 76-77. 
44. See Richard Schmalbeck, Income Averaging After Twenty Years: A Failed Ex-
periment in Horizontal Equity, 1984 DUKE L.J. 509, 509-10 (differentiating a progressive 
income tax from a flat tax (e.g., Social Security tax) and a regressive tax (e.g., Medicare 
tax)). For sake of comparison, sales taxes usually have a flat, statutory rate. 
45. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 29, at 1189 (defining "tax rate" as 
"[a] mathematical figure for calculating tax, usu[ally] as a percentage"). For federal tax rates 
imposed on married individuals, heads of households, unmarried individuals, estates, and 
trusts, see I.R.C. § l(a)-(e) (2006). 
46. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 29, at 1189 (using "marginal tax rate" to 
mean the tax on an additional dollar of income). Let m be the marginal tax rate, r the tax 
liability, and 1 the taxable income. Then, m = ~T I ~l. 
47. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 29, at 1187 (defining "tax base" as "[t]he 
total property, income, or wealth subject to taxation in a given jurisdiction" or "the aggregate 
value of the property being taxed by a particular tax"). Spending would be the tax base if the 
Code called for a consumptton tax instead of an income tax. In the hypothetical that follows, 
the tax base is $100,000. 
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2010.48 The first $8,375 is taxed at 10%, the next $25,625 at 15%, the next 
$48,400 at 25%, and the remaining $17,600 at 28%.49 In contrast to margin-
al tax rates, a taxpayer's "effective" tax rate is his average tax rate.50 Here, 
the total tax liability would be $21,709.25 giving an effective tax rate of 
21.7%.51 Adverse tax consequences arise when a portion of a plaintiffs re-
covery will be taxed at a higher marginal rate than the rate that would have 
been applied for each individual year. 52 
Controversy in tax law emerges most prominently whenever someone 
perceives the Code as being unfair or as taking advantage of the vulnerable. 
To gauge "the fairness, effectiveness, and desirability of [a particular] tax 
measure[]," tax analysts use "two sorts of equities: vertical and horizon-
tal."53 Vertical equity is the "premise that a person's greater ability to pay 
makes it 'fair' to require that person to bear a larger portion of the country's 
overall revenue needs"-a sort of substantive or redistributive equality.54 
48. See I.R.C. § l(c) (2006). 
49. See William Perez, 2010 Tax Rate Schedules: Tax Brackets for the 2010 Tax 
Year, ABOUT.COM, http://taxes.about.com/od/preparingyourtaxes/a/tax-rates 2.htm (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2011). - . 
50. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 29, at 1189 (defining "average tax 
rate" as "[a 1 taxpayer's tax liability divided by the amount of taxable income"). Let £ be the 
effective tax rate, r the tax liability, and 1 the taxable income. Then,£= r I 1. 
51. Add ($8,375)(0.10) + ($25,625)(0.15) + ($48,400)(.25) + ($17,600)(.28) to 
calculate the total tax liability. The effective tax rate is (total tax liability)/$) 00,000. 
52. The plaintiff's effective tax rate and tax liability will also be higher. 
53. Spitz, supra note 25, at 438. 
54. Hale E. Sheppard, Perpetuation of the Foreign Earned Income Exclusion: U.S. 
International Tax Policy, Political Reality, and the Necessity of Understanding How the Two 
Intertwine, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 727, 734 (2004). Modem progressive taxation can be 
traced back to Adam Smith, who wrote, "It is not very unreasonable that the rich should 
contribute to the public expense, not only in proportion to their revenue, but something more 
than in that proportion." ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS V.2.71 (Edwin Cannan ed., Methuen & Co.) (1776), available at 
http://www.econlib.org/library /Smith!sm WN21. htmi#B. V, %20Ch.2, %200f"/o20the%20Sour 
ces%20of%20the%20General%20or%20Public%20Revenue%20of"/o20the%20Society. 
Politicians, economists, and political scientists continue to debate the rationality of a progres-
sive tax system. See YABLON, supra note 3, at 140 (quoting Thomas Jefferson's belief that 
"[t]axes should be proportioned to what may be annually spared by the individual"); Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, President of the United States, Address at Worcester, Mass. (Oct. 21, 1936) 
(transcript available at Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, 
UCSB.EDU, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid= 1520 I #axzz I WGT8fAbL 
(last visited Aug. 27, 2011) ("Here is my principle: Taxes shall be levied according to ability 
to pay. That is the only American principle."). But see J.R. McCULLOCH, A TREATISE ON THE 
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICAL INFLUENCE OF TAXATION AND THE FUNDING SYSTEM 145 (1863) 
("The moment you abandon ... the cardinal principle of exacting from all individuals the 
same proportion of their income or their property, you are at sea without rudder or compass, 
and there is no amount of injustice and folly you may not commit."); LUDWIG VON MISES, 
HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 807 (Found. for Econ. Educ., Inc. 4th ed. 1996) 
("[A] system of discriminatory taxation [given] under the misleading name of progressive 
Negative Tax Consequences in Employment Dispute Recoveries 181 
Horizontal equity "seeks to tax similarly-situated taxpayers similarly."55 
These two themes recur often in employment law claims because a plaintiff 
in a discrimination suit may pay higher taxes than his peers or co-workers, 
even though all persons should have earned the same amount of income. 
B. How Adverse Tax Consequences Arise in Employment Law Cases 
1. "Bunching": Damages Paid in a Lump Sum 
By far, the most common type of negative tax consequence is "bunch-
ing," in which income earned over a period of time is received and taxed in 
a single year. 56 The concept of bunching can be best exemplified with the 
sale of long-held property. Although the fair market value of certain proper-
ty, such as land, may increase from year to year, the taxpayer does not re-
port any gain until a realization event_57 Thus, a property owner will have 
more taxable income in the year he sells or exchanges the asset, which 
could lift him into a higher tax bracket for that year. Luckily, the Code has § 
121 for excluding gain from the sale of principal residences58 and § 1(h) for 
capital gains. 59 In all likelihood, one of Congress's major justifications for 
lowering taxes in these circumstances is to alleviate bunching on real prop-
erty, stock, and other assets that may appreciate markedly.60 However, this 
tax benefit does not extend to pecuniary damages. 61 Therefore, a problem 
could present itself if an employee receives a three-year bonus in just one 
year, or, more importantly to this Note, is deprived of wages because of a 
wrongful discharge. 
To grasp the potential magnitude of adverse tax consequences on an 
average American taxpayer in the twenty-first century, the following hypo-
thetical will be discussed. This example is not meant to compute the precise 
amount of tax that will be owed in every case. Rather, the fact pattern con-
tains fairly simple numbers that serve to illustrate how negative tax conse-
quences come up and the impact they may have on an everyday person. The 
taxation" is "a mode of disguised expropriation of the successful capitalists and entrepre-
neurs."). 
55. Spitz, supra note 25, at 438. 
56. Polsky & Befort, supra note 32, at 73. 
57. BURKE & FRIEL, supra note 3, at 28-30. 
58. See I.R.C. § l21(a) (2006) ("Gross income shall not include gain from the sale 
or exchange of property if, during the 5-year period ending on the date of the sale or ex-
change, such property has been owned and used by the taxpayer as the taxpayer's principal 
residence for periods aggregating 2 years or more."). 
59. See id. at§ l(h) (providing preferential tax rates for capital assets). 
60. Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains 
Preference, 48 TAXL. REV. 319,330 (1993). 
61. See I.R.C. § 1222(3) (2006) (requiring a capital asset for long-term capital 
gains); id. at§ 1221(a) (defining a capital asset as "property"). 
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actual computation can be somewhat time-consuming, and this may be one 
reason why courts tend to avoid the issue. In spite of the mathematics in-
volved, another goal of this exercise is to demonstrate that the calculations 
are not that hard and thus, courts should be able to handle a plaintiffs tax 
demands.62 Nevertheless, judges, Congress, and the public must remember 
that although the Code may seem daunting at times/3 "[w]e [still] cannot 
lose sight of the fact that complexity [in tax law] is the result of our struggle 
for fairness."64 Convenience should not replace accuracy.65 For ease in this 
Note only, many details will be omitted and considerations, such as infla-
tion, raises, and deductions, ignored. 
Suppose a single-filing worker had an annual salary of $35,452 before 
being wrongfully terminated five years ago.66 Based on 2005 to 2009 tax 
brackets/7 the employee would have paid $5,528 in income taxes for 2005, 
$5,420.50 for 2006, $5,286.75 for 2007, $5,206.75 for 2008, and $5,050.50 
for 2009.68 Therefore, the employee's total tax liability would have been 
62. See BURKE & FRIEL, supra note 3, at v ("[T]he complexities [in tax law] are 
manageable."); see also infra Section III.A (arguing that computing taxes is neither an ardu-
ous nor an out-of-the-ordinary exercise for courts to undertake). 
63. Over the years, many observers have criticized or poked fun at the Code for 
being too perplexing, including Judge Learned Hand: 
In my own case the words of such an act as the Income Tax, for example, merely 
dance before my eyes in a meaningless procession; cross-reference to cross-
reference, exception upon exception--couched in abstract terms that offer no han-
dle to seize hold of-leave in my mind only a confused sense of some vitally im-
portant, but successfully concealed, purport, which it is my duty to extract, but 
which is within my power, if at all, only after the most inordinate expenditure of 
time. 
YABLON, supra note 3, at 46; see also Dave Barry, April's Been Cruel Again, CHI. TRIB., 
Apr. 30, 2000, http:/larticles.chicagotribune.com/2000-04-30/features/0004300284 _I_ tax-
forms-tax-guide-united-states-tax-code ("As a taxpayer, you are required to be fully in com-
pliance with the United States Tax Code, which is currently the size and weight of the Bud-
weiser Clydesdales."). 
64. YABLON, supra note 3, at 144; see also C. EUGENE STEUERLE, CONTEMPORARY 
U.S. TAX POLICY 266 (2d ed. 2008) ("No matter how much badly designed tax policies stand 
as evidence that getting it 'right' is difficult, when good policies are enacted and revisions 
well-timed, they remind us that political honesty ... and integrity can help create a ... more 
... equitable system."); YABLON, supra note 3, at 29 (quoting tax professor Edward 
McCaffery: Tax law "has unavoidable moral ... dimensions."). 
65. "Simplicity is not a goal per se, and it is definitely undesirable when it conflicts 
with the major objectives of a good tax system." Robert B. Eichholz, Should the Federal 
Income Tax Be Simplified?, 48 YALE L.J. 1200, 1220 (1939); see also Dobson v. Comm'r., 
320 U.S. 489,495 (1943) ("[Tax law] can never be made simple."). 
66. This figure is the United States' per capita personal income for the year 2005. 
Per Capita Personal Income by State, 1990 to 2009, BUREAU OF Bus. & EcoN. REs., U. OF 
N.M., http://bber.unm.edu/econ!us-pci.htm (last updated Sept. 22, 2011). 
67. IRS tax-rate schedules for each year in question should be used. 
68. See IRS Income Tax Tables & Rates, LIBERTY TAX SERVICE, 
http://www.libertytax.com/irs-income-tax-tables-rates.html (last visited Jan. I, 2011). For 
Negative Tax Consequences in Employment Dispute Recoveries 183 
$26,492.50.69 If the worker initiates an unlawful discrimination suit in 2009 
against his former employer and wins, then the court will probably award 
$177,260 as a lump sum.70 Without taking into account any other income 
sources,71 this amount will move the employee up two levels-from the 
25% tax bracket to the 33% tax bracket for 2009.72 Assume further that the 
defendant-employer pays the entire lump sum in 2009 and that the employ-
ee's taxable year ends on December 31, 2009. Then, the plaintiff must re-
port $177,260 as income for that year. Under this scenario, the worker will 
pay $43,638.30 in income taxes on the lump sum/3 not $26,492.50. The 
difference is $17,145.80, which comprises 48% of the employee's yearly 
salary74 and more than 56% of what would have been his net income in 
2009.75 In other words, Mr. Taxpayer will lose approximately six months 
worth of compensation, even though his employt?r, not he, committed the 
wrong. His effective tax rate jumps from 14.9% to 24.6%. 
Obviously, averaging one's income over a set number of years could 
reduce the problem. From 1964 to 1986, the Code contained these types of 
provisions, enabling a taxpayer to apply a lower tax rate for years when his 
taxable income exceeded his average taxable income over the previous four 
years by more than 40%.76 Had Congress not repealed these statutes,77 a 
2005, the worker falls into the 25% bracket. Thus, the first $7,300 is taxed at 10%, the next 
$22,400 at 15%, and the last $5,752 at 25%. Taxes for 2006 to 2009 are calculated in a simi-
lar fashion. 
69. The taxpayer would have had an effective tax rate of 14.9%. To calculate the 
worker's effective tax rate, divide his tax liability for the five years ($26,492.50) by his total 
wages ($177 ,260). See supra note 50 and accompanying text (supplying a formula for calcu-
lating effective tax rates). 
70. The plaintiff would have earned $35,452 each year for five years. 
71. In real life, this assumption is extremely unlikely. Almost certainly, the worker 
will have other sources of income and depending on whether the employee has a duty to 
mitigate, this income may push him into an even higher tax bracket. See Canney, supra note 
32, at 1135 n.217 (citing O'Neill v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 108 F. Supp. 2d 443, 448 (E.D. 
Pa. 2000)) ("A plaintiff's 'gross-up income' should include the lump-sum backpay award as 
well as any other non-judgment-related earnings for the year."). !d. at 1118 n.60 ("[l]fplain-
tiffs work to mitigate backpay damages as [Title VII] directs, they will be taxed for wages 
earned during years actually worked at one effective rate, but taxed on the lump-sum back-
pay award at a different, usually higher, rate."). 
72. The threshold for the 25% tax bracket was $82,250 and for the 28% tax bracket, 
$171,550, in 2009. For 2009 tax rates specifically, see William Perez, 2009 Tax Rate Sched-
ules: Tax Brackets for the 2009 Tax Year, ABOUT.COM, http://taxes.about.com/ 
od/2009taxes/qt/2009 _tax _rates.htm (last visited Jan. I, 20 II). 
73. See id. 
74. Divide $17,145.80, his total tax liability, by $35,452, his yearly salary. 
75. Divide $17,145.80, his total tax liability, by ($35,452- $5050.50), his yearly 
salary minus normal tax liability for the year 2009. 
76. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 232, 78 Stat. 19, I 05-12; I.R.C. § 
1302( c )(2) ( 1982) (repealed 1986). 
77. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 141, 100 Stat. 2085,2117. 
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wrongly discharged employee would not suffer as harshly today.78 However, 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 did eliminate the "income-averaging" provi-
sions.79 As a result, a plaintiff in an employment suit incurs a higher level of 
tax liability than he would have had the payments been spaced out appropri-
ately. Furthermore, a variety of circumstances, in practice, could actually 
exacerbate the worker's negative tax consequences-even more than the 
hypothetical plaintiff experienced. For example, a married plaintiff who 
would have earned wages while single may, because of his changed marital 
status, have a higher marginal tax rate at the time of recovery.8° Congress 
may also raise marginal tax rates in the interim, requiring a successful plain-
tiff to pay taxes based on the elevated, present-day rate. 
2. The AMT "Trap": Disallowing a Deduction for Attorneys' Fees 
Since passing the AMT in 1969,81 Congress has maintained two sepa-
rate, but parallel tax schemes: a regular tax and an alternative tax.82 When a 
taxpayer's AMT liability exceeds his regular tax liability, he must pay the 
higher amount. 83 The AMT serves to limit or modify the credits, deductions, 
and exclusions a taxpayer may use to prevent high-income individuals from 
completely "escap[ing] their fair share of taxation"-a form of vertical eq-
uity.84 Specifically, the AMT withholds a deduction for miscellaneous item-
ized deductions, such as attorneys' fees, and may even impose a marginal 
78. Income averaging will not always reduce a plaintiff's negative tax consequenc-
es. See Sears v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 749 F.2d 1451, 1456 (lOth Cir. 1984) 
(realizing that plaintiffs would still be in the highest tax bracket even with income averag-
ing). For a debate on the effectiveness of income averaging and its influence on different 
social classes, compare Lily L. Batchfelder, Taxing the Poor: Income Averaging Reconsid-
ered, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395, 404-06 (2003) (contending that the poor will normally 
benefit from income averaging), with Schmalbeck, supra note 44, at 578 (arguing that be-
cause income averaging helps the rich, the Code should not contain income-averaging provi-
sions). 
79. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 141, I 00 Stat. 2085, 2117. 
80. Judges and lawyers call this the "marriage penalty." Boris I. Bittker, Federal 
Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1429-31 (1975). 
81. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487. 
82. JOSHUA SHAKIN, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE INDIVIDUAL ALTERNATIVE 
MINIMUM TAX (2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/108xx/doc10800/01-15-
AMT_Brief.pdf. 
83. I.R.C. § 55(a) (2006). Determining which liability is greater "depends on the 
complex interaction of many variables," but it is safe to say that a taxpayer's AMT liability 
will generally exceed his regular liability whenever he has expenses that are not deductible 
under the regular tax. Sager & Cohen, supra note 38, at I 077 n.9. 
84. Polsky & Befort, supra note 32, at 79. See also supra Section I.A (defining 
vertical and horizontal equity). 
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tax rate above 35%.85 The IRS ordinarily subjects miscellaneous itemized 
deductions to a 2% floor, meaning a taxpayer can only receive a deduction 
on amounts over 2% of adjusted gross income.86 However, these items can-
not be deducted at all whenever the AMT controls.87 
In the employment law context, a successful plaintiff will undoubtedly 
incur substantial lawyering fees, yet if the AMT is triggered, the employee 
will be forced to pay out-of-pocket expenses to cover taxes incident to the 
recovery.88 The AMT trap has been partially resolved in unlawful discrimi-
nation suits, detailed below, but in peculiar circumstances could still rear its 
ugly head and "tum[] an apparent pre-tax 'winner' into an after-tax 'los-
er. "'89 
Therefore, the AMT has been, not surprisingly, widely criticized for 
expanding beyond its intended scope90 and contradicting fundamental tax 
85. The Code defines "miscellaneous itemized deductions" in the negative and, by 
not mentioning legal fees, characterizes attorneys' fees as such. I.R.C. § 56(b)(l)(A)(i) 
(2006); see also id. at§ 67(b) (not referring to attorneys' fees). 
86. /d. § 67(a) ("In the case of an individual, the miscellaneous itemized deductions 
for any taxable year shall be allowed only to the extent that the aggregate of such deductions 
exceeds 2 percent of adjusted gross income."). 
87. Courts and commentators have used the discharge of indebtedness doctrine, 
made famous in Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929), as the ra-
tionale behind including legal fees in gross income. See id. at 726, 729 (hold,ing that a tax-
payer must realize gross income in the amount of the discharged obligation whenever a third 
party discharges some or all of the taxpayer's obligation); see also Sinyard v. Comm'r, 268 
F.3d 756,757 (9th Cir. 2001) (labeling the defendant's payment of attorneys' fees as merely 
a discharge in income on behalf of the plaintiff). 
88. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (explaining that a plaintiff may peti-
tion the court for attorneys' fees, but must report this award as gross income). Cases involv-
ing the AMT usually concern settlements, in which "the plaintiff has paid his attorney the 
relevant amount of fees out of [his] total recovery, or where the defendant, pursuant to the 
terms of the settlement, wrote two different checks-one to the plaintiff representing his net 
recovery and one to the plaintiff's attorney representing his fee." Polsky & Befort, supra note 
32, at 88 (footnote omitted). However, the situation where the defendant pays the plaintiff's 
attorney through a court order after a victory by plaintiff should be analyzed similarly. /d. at 
88 & n.l24; see also Civil Rights Tax Relief Act of 2009, H.R. 3035, Ill th Cong. (2009) 
(failing to distinguish between damages from suit or agreement, or from a lump sum or peri-
odic payments). Thus, no distinction will be made between fees paid pursuant to a judgment 
or through a settlement. 
89. Polsky & Befort, supra note 32, at 79. 
90. The AMT has evolved to not only encompass upper-class taxpayers, but middle-
class ones too. See SHAKIN, supra note 82 (predicting that in 2010, "one in six taxpayers will 
be affected by the AMT"); Leonard E. Burman et al., The AMT: Projections and Problems, 
100 TAX NOTES 105 (2003) (projecting that by 2010, 92% of households with income be-
tween $100,000 and $500,000 will pay the AMT). Although 2010 has passed, the AMT has 
been controversial for more than just the last few years. Scott Bernard Nelson, Escape the 
AMT Trap, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP. (MAR. 18, 2008), http://money.usnews.com 
/money/business-economy/small-business/articles/2008/03/18 /escape-the-amt-trap. 
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policy ,91 especially since a plaintiff may be required to pay taxes on money 
that goes directly to his lawyer as part of a contingency agreement.92 In gen-
eral, Congress has not been averse to allowing deductions for trade or busi-
ness expenses,93 but the AMT prevents an employee from deducting any 
legal costs spent to recover compensation for lost wages. At least two law 
professors have put forward the notion that all attorneys' fees should be 
classified as employee business expenses to avoid the AMT trap in any con-
text, 94 yet judges have not been convinced. 95 A "very cornerstone of [ Ameri-
can tax law] rests on the idea that [taxes should only apply to] economic 
benefit[s]" that are controlled and enjoyed.96 However, the attorney fee por-
tion still gets double taxed-both to the client and his lawyer--even though 
the plaintiff-employee has little more than temporary control over his attor-
91. See Polsky & Befort, supra note 32, at 70, 81 (calling the AMT "simply awful" 
and "absurd" policy). 
92. Contingent agreements usually provide "that the attorney will receive the greater 
of (a) some percentage of the overall recovery ... or (b) the amount of court-awarded attor-
neys' fees." Polsky, supra note 31, at 625. In situations where (b) is higher than (a), "it may 
actually be in the [employee's] best interests not to petition for attorney[s'] fees." !d. For 
discussion on how the AMT trap may infringe upon a lawyer's undivided loyalty to his cli-
ent, see supra note 31 and accompanying text. Most likely, an employee will not be antici-
pating any adverse tax consequences. Thus, attorneys' fees will almost always be granted 
and sometimes are mandatory. 
93. I.R.C. § 162(a) (2006) (enabling a deduction for "all the ordinary and necessary 
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business"). 
94. See Sager & Cohen, supra note 38, at 1096-97 (arguing that attorneys' fees 
should be deducted as business expenses, not as miscellaneous itemized deductions, because 
an individual should not pay tax on the cost of producing taxable income); Gregg D. Polsky, 
A Correct Analysis of the Tax Treatment of Contingent Attorney's Fee Arrangements: 
Enough with the Fruits and the Trees, 37 GA. L. REv. 57, 73 (2002) (attorneys' fees "bear a 
clear and direct relationship to taxable income"). 
95. See Biehl v. Comm'r, 351 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2003) (believing that legal 
fees in an employment-related case should only be considered a business expense if the fees 
would be paid while the plaintiff was still employed by the payor and in the interests of the 
payor); Alexander v. IRS, 72 F.3d 938, 944-47 (I st Cir. 1995) (attorneys' fees do not qualify 
as reimbursed business expenses). Judges often rely on the assignment of income doctrine. 
For discussion on why this doctrine should have no relevance to the AMT trap, see Polsky, 
supra note 94, at 88-92 (plaintiff and his lawyer have an "arm's length" relationship). The 
assignment of income doctrine was developed "to prevent the subversion of the progressive 
rate structure of the tax system through the use of artificial income-splitting between related 
parties." !d. at 79; see also Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 114 (1940) (holding that a 
father cannot assign interest rights to his underage son); Comm'r v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 113-
15 (1930) (same with high-earning husband vis-a-vis his unemployed wife). Numerous law 
review articles play the semantics game to either justify or refute grossing up. This Note 
simply lobbies for a sensible judicial interpretation. 
96. Sharon Reece, Lemonade from Lemons: The Solution to Taxation of the Contin-
gent Fee Portion of Damage Awards, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 305, 336 (2004). 
Negative Tax Consequences in Employment Dispute Recoveries 187 
neys' fees and hardly exercises the dominion over them that the Supreme 
Court requires.97 
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 responded to disapproval98 
over the AMT trap and ameliorated the problem to a significant degree.99 
The Act provides that "[a ]ny deduction ... for attorney fees and court costs 
paid by ... the taxpayer in connection with any action ... [for] unlawful 
discrimination" will be an above-the-line deduction.100 However, § 62 does 
not specifically grant relief from the AMT trap for ancillary claims of dis-
crimination, such as negligent and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress or loss of consortium} 01 Since it is unclear whether attorneys' fees 
related to such ancillary claims would be entitled to relief,102 the AMT prob-
lem may persist and, therefore, will not be completely ignored in this Note. 
Furthermore, the unwillingness of judges to gross up under extreme circum-
stances-when the AMT trap is implemented-reveals a strong opposition 
toward gross ups and suggests that courts will not address the plaintiffs 
adverse tax consequences due to bunching on their own. Without congres-
sional action, the Supreme Court, in Commissioner v. Banks, 103 would have 
continued the tradition of including attorneys' fees as miscellaneous item-
ized deductions, even though plaintiffs might have recovered nothing or 
actually lost money. If courts did not correct an employee's negative tax 
consequences when the injustice was so blatant, how can one expect judges 
to do so under less obvious, but still meaningful, circumstances? 104 
To appreciate the enormous burden the AMT can inflict, return to the 
hypothetical from Subsection I.B.l and assume the trial court ordered the 
defendant-employer to reimburse the worker $400,000 in legal fees for an 
97. In the eyes of the Supreme Court, "income" means "ownership." Poe v. Seaborn, 
282 U.S. 101, 109 (1930). 
98. See James Serven, Oral Argument in Hukkanen-Campbe/1: Taxpayers' Last 
Stand?, 93 TAX NOTES 854, 859 (2001) (asserting before the addition of§ 62(a)(20) that 
"[t]here is ... no public policy or conceptual theory by which the denial of a deduction under 
the AMT for ... attorney's fees ... can be plausibly defended"). 
99. It is important to remember that law review articles and scholarly criticism do 
not always fall on deaf ears and can actually result in positive change, as evidenced by § 
62(a)(20). 
100. American Jobs Creation Act of2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (codi-
fied at J.R.C. § 62(a)(20) (2006)). 
10 I. HENRY H. PERRITT, EMPLOYMENT LAW UPDATE 5-18 (2008). 
102. /d. (citing Robert W. Wood, Tax Aspects of Settlements and Judgments, in BNA 
U.S. INCOME PORTFOLIOS: INCOME, DEDUCTIONS, CREDITS AND COMPUTATION OF TAX 522 § 
V.G.2 (3d ed. 2005)) ("The IRS may argue that the attorneys' fees should be allocated be-
tween the discrimination and nondiscrimination claims."). 
103. 543 U.S. 426 (2005) (providing that if a litigant's recovery constitutes gross 
income, the litigant must include in gross income the portion of the recovery paid to the 
attorney as a contingent fee). 
104. Therefore, Congress might again have to intervene if courts do not address a 
plaintiff's adverse tax consequences in the bunching context. 
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auxiliary claim resulting in the same monetary award. The size of this al-
lowance relative to the amount in wages will almost always implicate the 
AMT. The employee would then have to include $577,260 in his 2009 taxa-
ble income, but could deduct the attorneys' fees only when computing his 
regular tax. 105 From before, the worker would have $43,638.30 in income 
tax using the usual method. Under the AMT regime though, the first 
$46,700 is taxed at the ordinary rate, the next $175,000 is taxed at 26%, and 
the remaining $355,560 at 28%, yielding a total tax liability of 
$152,919.30. 106 In sum, the worker, at an effective tax rate of 26.5%, will 
net $24,340.70-barely 14% ofhis overall judgment, 18% ofhis lump sum 
after taxes minus attorneys' fees, and 16% of the after-tax wages he would 
have earned in due course-all because of fees he never possessed and a 
wrongful termination he did not ask for. 107 The tax consequences become 
"even more dramatic as the ratio of attorney's fees to the gross settlement 
[or verdict] amount increases."108 lfthe worker's lawyers charged more than 
just $400,000, the plaintiff could quickly end up in the red, as happened to a 
female police officer in Spina v. Forest Preserve District of Cook County. 109 
Again, § 62 of the Code solves the AMT problem to a large extent. Howev-
er, as noted by one prominent tax attorney, this potential solution is not 
"foolproof'110 and highlights how reluctant courts are to gross up, begging 
the question: why did Congress not address negative tax consequences un-
der all circumstances in the American Jobs Creation Act of2004? 111 
105. The plaintiffs taxable income overstates his true economic income by the price 
of his attorneys' fees. 
106. For AMT tax rates, see William Perez, Alternative Minimum Tax, ABOUT.COM, 
http://taxes.about.com/od/1040/a/minimum _tax.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2011 ). 
107. In paying the alternative tax, the worker keeps $24,340.70 compared to 
$133,621.70 after tax on the lump sum and $150,767.50 if no illegal conduct had taken place. 
Stated another way, the plaintiff will owe $126,426.80 more in taxes if no discrimination had 
occurred and $109,281 more in taxes ifhe had not taken advantage of the fee-shifting stat-
utes. 
108. Polsky, supra note 94, at 67. 
109. 207 F. Supp. 2d 764, 777 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (reducing a jury's award from $3 
million to $200,000 and, therefore, requiring the plaintiff to pay back "her entire award, plus 
$154,322 of her own money (money which she does not have) to the IRS"). 
110. Robert W. Wood, AMT Problems for Attorney Fees Remain, FORBES.COM, Dec. 
22, 20 I 0, http:/ /blogs. forbes.com/robertwood/20 I 0/12/22/amt-problems-for -attorney-fees-
remain/#post_ comments. 
Ill. See infra note 153 and accompanying text (discussing Polsky & Befort who 
conclude that the AMT trap and bunching both cause adverse tax consequences regardless of 
the source). Therefore, Congress should also fix the bunching problem and any remnants of 
the AMT trap. See infra Section IV.B (advocating for an enhanced bill). 
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II. ESHELMAN V. AGERE SYSTEMS AND THE GROWING DIVIDE OVER HOW TO 
HANDLE TAX ISSUES 
On January 30, 2009, the Third Circuit added to a split among federal 
courts by publishing an opinion approving of "gross ups."112 With very little 
persuasive-and no binding--case law on point, the Eshelman court relied 
on Title VII Supreme Court cases. 113 That Court has repeatedly held that the 
"chief remedial purpose of employment discrimination statutes . . . is 'to 
make persons whole "'114 and emphasized that "Congress armed [judges] 
with broad equitable powers to effectuate this 'make whole' remedy."115 In 
opposition to Eshelman, a trial court in Illinois declined "to [travel] down 
[this] slippery slope and wade into [the] legal morass [of gross ups]," 116 for 
as one circuit said, "[ w ]e know of no authority for such relief."117 This sec-
tion familiarizes the reader with the facts and procedural history of 
Eshelman and puts the Third Circuit's decision in perspective, especially as 
it relates to how other courts have dealt with adverse tax consequences. Pri-
or to Eshelman, only two circuit courts had addressed the issue and each 
came to a different conclusion,118 yet Congress still provided the tools-
even if not directly-for awarding gross ups. 119 
112. Eshelman v. Agere Sys., Inc., 554 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2009). 
113. !d. at 440 n.7. 
114. !d. at 440 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975); 
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352,358 (1995)). 
115. !d. at 440 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(l) (2006); Franks v. Bowman Transp. 
Co., 424 U.S. 747, 767 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 418). 
116. Spina v. Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook Cnty., 207 F. Supp. 2d 764, 777 (N.D. Ill. 
2002). 
117. Dashnaw v. Peiia, 12 F.3d 1112, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (per curiam). ("Absent 
an arrangement by voluntary settlement of the parties, the, general rule that victims of dis-
crimination should be made whole does not support 'gross-ups' of backpay to cover tax 
liability."). 
118. In Hukkanen v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Hoisting & Porta-
ble Local No. 101, the Eighth Circuit ignored the plaintiffs adverse tax consequences asso-
ciated with receiving multiple years of pay and retirement benefits in a single year because 
"she failed to present evidence of the ... amount or a convenient way for the [lower] court to 
calculate the amount." 3 F.3d 281, 287 (8th Cir. 1993). Therefore, the Hukkanen case stands 
for the proposition that a plaintiff-employee must introduce some statistical or financial 
evidence in the record to have a chance at a gross up, not necessarily that a gross up is al-
ways inappropriate. Plenty of other courts have also been able to skirt the issue on eviden-
tiary grounds. See, e.g., Shovlin v. Timemed Labeling Sys., Inc., No. 95-CV-4808, 1997 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 2350, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 1997) (denying a gross up because the plaintiff 
did not produce an expert witness); infra note 149 (explaining EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, 
Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 1364, (S.D. Fla. 1998)). Thus, one should be careful when determining 
why a court declined to award a gross up. Was the decision based on the plaintiff's factual 
showing or the equitable relief itself? Hukkanen "suggests that if a district court has ... proof 
of negative tax liability ... , the power to grant such an award would be within its discretion." 
Canney, supra note 32, at 1126. Another Eighth Circuit case disallowed a gross up solely 
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A. The Story Behind the Lawsuit 
In Eshelman, the Third Circuit explored how far courts should venture 
when protecting an employee's right, in the face of wrongful termination, to 
become "whole" again-at least in the economic sense. 120 Western Electric, 
the predecessor to Agere Systems, hired Joan Eshelman (Eshelman or Plain-
tift), in 1981.121 Over a twenty-year period, Plaintiff advanced steadily 
through the company, eventually becoming a supervisor and then a manag-
er.122 In 1998, doctors diagnosed Eshelman with breast cancer and soon 
thereafter, she took a medical leave of absence to receive treatrnent. 123 Al-
most immediately, Plaintiff started suffering from short-term memory loss, 
a side effect of chemotherapy .124 Despite the affliction, Eshelman kept her 
supervisors informed about her condition and continued to receive excellent 
performance reviews. 125 Unfortunately, Agere Systems began experiencing 
financial troubles in October 2001; management proceeded to lay off em-
ployees and even threatened to close the facility where Eshelman worked. 126 
because of sovereign immunity. See Arneson v. Callahan, 128 F.3d 1243, 1245-47 (8th Cir. 
1997) (holding that the plaintiff cannot get a gross up when suing the Social Security Admin-
istration or other government defendants). The Eighth Circuit has not directly addressed 
whether a plaintiff can receive a gross up against a private employer when the appropriate 
foundational evidence has been laid. However, the Eighth Circuit would seem inclined to 
allow a gross up under these circumstances. 
119. Gross ups have also been denied on constitutional grounds. See Kelley v. City of 
Albuquerque, No. CIV 03-507 JB/ACT, 2006 WL 1304954, at *1, *6 (claiming that gross 
ups are unconstitutional because additur violates the Seventh Amendment); see also infra 
note 234 and accompanying text (citing Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935), which pro-
hibits additur in federal courts). 
120. See Canney, supra note 32, at I 112 ("[Eshelman's lawsuit] test[ed] the limits of 
remedies available to plaintiffs alleging employment discrimination." (footnote omitted)). 
But see infra Section IV.A (arguing that the Third Circuit could have "ventured" farther by 
presuming a gross up). 
121. Eshelman v. Agere Sys., Inc., 554 F .3d 426, 430 (3d Cir. 2009). 
122. /d. at 430. Plaintiff became supervisor of the Chieflnformation Office in Read-
ing, Pennsylvania, and in June 2001, three years after contracting cancer, was promoted "to a 
higher managerial position, which was accompanied by a $7,000.00 raise." !d. at 430-31. 
123. /d. at 430. 
124. /d. at 430-31. A cognitive dysfunction, commonly known as "chemo brain," 
caused Eshelman's impairment. !d. 
125. /d. at 431. Plaintiff had to carry a notebook and take additional notes to remind 
herself of instructions and projects, but doing this did not affect "Agere' s perception of her as 
a valued employee." !d. Defendants agreed that "Eshelman excelled at her job" and con-
firmed that she "received Agere's highest possible performance rating" in 1999 and 2000. !d. 
See also Eshelman v. Agere Sys., lnc., 397 F. Supp. 2d 557, 564 (E.D. Pa 2005) (detailing 
Plaintiff's promotions, raises, and bonuses and pointing out that Eshelman received positive 
evaluations during and after her illness). 
126. Eshelman, 554 F.3d at 431. With sudden, sharp declines in profitability, the 
company implemented a program to reduce the workforce. /d. Ultimately, Agere Systems' 
cutbacks led to the layoff of 18,000 employees worldwide. !d. 
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The company responded to the downturn by ranking employees on a wide 
assessment of skills to determine who "would be needed following [some] 
corporate restructuring."127 Eshelman was initially rated very highly and her 
bosses even took steps "to shield [her] from termination.'ms However, the 
company soon altered her scores after learning that she would not travel to a 
new facility .129 In refusing to relocate, Plaintiff lost her job and brought suit 
under the ADA.130 Eshelman cited her memory deficiencies as the reason 
behind her dismissal. 131 
B. Both the Trial and Appellate Courts Accept Eshelman's Pleas for Relief 
Eshelman ultimately obtained a jury verdict in her favor for 
$200,000. 132 Following entry of judgment, she filed a post-trial motion, ask-
ing the district court to enhance her recovery for the adverse tax conse-
quences she would incur. 133 Plaintiff submitted an affidavit from a financial 
expert who calculated this tax "penalty" based on the amount of back pay, 
applicable tax rates, and her income tax liabilities for the affected years. 134 
The trial court agreed with Eshelman in principle and granted her partial 
relief-an extra $6,893. 135 Agere Systems did not rebut the testimony of 
Eshelman's witness nor did it dispute the accuracy of the figure derived. 136 
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's findings: "Without 
this type of equitable relief in appropriate cases, it would not be possible" 137 
to "locate '[the] just result'"138 that the American public demands. Congress 
gave courts wide discretion "to assure 'the most complete relief. "'139 While 
127. /d. Employees who scored above a certain level retained their jobs. /d. 
128. !d. 
129. !d. at 432. 
130. /d. Agere Systems laid off Eshelman effective December 30, 2001, believing 
that Plaintiff lacked the ability to commute to new sites in Breiningsville and Allentown, "a 
limitation ... attributed to [her] chemotherapy." /d. 
131. /d. at 430. Plaintiff argued that Agere Systems "unlawfully discharged her be-
cause of her record of cancer-related disability, or because it regarded her as disabled." !d. 
132. !d. at 432. The jury returned a special verdict, giving Plaintiff $170,000 in back 
pay and $30,000 in compensatory damages. !d. 
133. !d. at 432. Agere Systems moved for judgment as a matter of law and alterna-
tively for a new trial, alleging insufficient evidence and improper instruction. /d. at 432-33. 
134. /d. at 442. 
135. !d. at 442-43. On October 20, 2005, the trial court granted Eshelman's motion 
and denied Defendant's motions. !d. at 432-33. 
136. ld. at 443. 
137. /d. at 442. 
138. !d. at443 (quotingLangnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531,541 (1931)). 
139. !d. at 442 (quoting Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 
U.S. 421, 465 (1986)); 118 CONG. REc. 7168 (1972) (statement of Sen. Williams) ("[The 
Equal Employment Opportunify Act of 1972 is] intended to give the courts [large reign] ... 
to [ensure] the most complete relief possible."). 
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engaging in this task, Judge Michael Chagares compared grossing up to the 
well-accepted practice of including pre-judgment interest in a back pay 
award, 140 which recognizes that a plaintiff's grievances may be more exten-
sive than wages themselves. 141 Thus, the Third Circuit merely complied with 
the "make-whole" objective of the ADA and took advantage of the liberties 
and flexibility that Congress supplied. 
C. Federal and State Cases That Previously Contemplated a "Gross Up" 
1. Cases Supporting Plaintiff-Employee's Tax Raise 
Historically, the leading case advocating for the propriety of gross ups 
is Sears v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., in which the Tenth 
Circuit held a labor union and railroad company liable for seventeen years' 
worth of back pay, plus a tax component, stemming from a Title VII race 
violation. 142 Plaintiff, Joe Vernon Sears, filed a class action on behalf of the 
railroad's train porters, alleging that the defendant favored the company's 
white brakemen over its black porters.143 The Tenth Circuit ruled that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion when "[reimbursing] class mem-
bers for their additional tax liability."144 Sears, however, did not create a 
blanket presumption of a gross up, but stressed that only under "special [or 
extraordinary] circumstances" should a court augment an award for tax pur-
poses: compensation for negative tax consequences may not be fitting in 
every case, or even the "typical" case. 145 Here, the payment of a lump sum 
after more than a decade and a half would have placed most of the plaintiffs 
in the highest income tax bracket for the year of receipt. 146 With "the 
140. Eshelman, 554 F.3d at 442 (drawing on "the now-universal acceptance of ... 
prejudgment interest on back pay awards"). Pre-judgment interest is the interest accruing on 
a back pay award. Courts employ various tables and methods to calculate pre-judgment 
interest. See, e.g., Taxman v. Bd. ofEduc., 91 F.3d 1547, 1566 (3d Cir. 1996) (IRS-adjusted 
prime rate); Conway v. Electro Switch Corp., 825 F.2d 593, 602 (1st Cir. 1987) (federal 
judgment rate); Gelofv. Papineau, 829 F.2d 452, 456 (3d Cir. 1987) (state judgment rate). 
141. See Eshelman, 554 F.3d at 442 (stating that tax gross ups, along with pre-
judgment interest, acknowledge "that the harm to a prevailing employee's pecuniary interest 
may be broader in scope than just a loss ofback pay"). 
142. 749 F.2d 1451, 1453 (lOth Cir. 1984). The district court had ordered seniority 
relief, back pay, attorneys' fees, and a tax gross up. Sears v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe 
Ry. Co., No. W-4963, 1982 WL 500, at *5-8 (D. Kan. Dec. I, 1982). 
143. Sears, 749 F.2d at 1453. 
144. !d. at 1456. According to the Tenth Circuit, the Supreme Court provided courts 
with a wide array of damages for Title VII violations. See id. (citing Ford Motor Co. v. 
EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 230 (1982)). 
145. /d. 
146. /d. 
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pro[long]ed nature of the litigation,"147 the Tenth Circuit felt obligated to 
gross up. District courts, outside the Tenth Circuit, in Missouri,t48 Florida,t49 
and Pennsylvania150 went on to adopt Sears' line of reasoning, distinguish-
ing between pecuniary awards and ones "solely a product of the lawsuit," 
such as punitive and liquidated damages: 151 
The goal of [anti-discrimination and wrongful termination statutes] is to allow 
plaintiff to keep the same amount of money as if he had not been unlawfully termi-
nated. [Adhering to] this goal requires reimbursement for the reduced amount of 
front pay money that the plaintiff has to invest as a result of higher taxes, as well as 
reimbursement for the higher taxes he must pay on his back wages caused by get-
ting this money in a lump sum .... [While Mr. O'Neill] is entitled to receive the 
value of front pay and backpay that he would have received over his work life ... 
[,he] would not have received [the compensatory and liquidated damages] but for 
the defendant's discriminatory action. Hence, allowing the plaintiff to recover the 
increased tax he will have to pay on these sums does more than make him whole. It 
gives the plaintiff a windfall. 152 
When faced with an AMT problem,t53 a trial judge in Washington D.C. sug-
gested that courts do have the power to enforce gross ups: "If [plaintiff's] 
147. !d. Also, many of the class members (close to 40%) died before the decision and 
the Code's income-averaging provisions did not cover deceased taxpayers' estates. !d. (citing 
Treas. Reg. § 1.1303-l(a) (1983)). However, this point seems moot considering the income-
averaging provisions would have had little effect anyway. See supra note 78 and accompany-
ing text (explaining how income averaging would not have lowered the class' negative tax 
consequences). In sum, the Tenth Circuit held that a gross up may be within the discretion of 
a district court as long as the facts warrant such a remedy. 
148. See Arneson v. Sullivan, 958 F. Supp. 443, 445-46 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (following 
Sears very closely in awarding $117,803 when nine years of wages, composed of 
$295,555.20 in basic pay and $6,903.67 in overtime pay, had to be taxed in a single year). 
Without the gross up, the plaintiff would have been deprived of 38.9% of his recovery. 
149. See EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1380 (S.D. Fla. 1998) 
("[A] district court, in the exercise of its discretion," may provide a gross up "to offset what-
ever increased tax liability a claimant will experience by receiving a lump sum award."). In 
this sex-discrimination case, however, the plaintiff did not provide enough proof. !d. 
150. See O'Neill v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 108 F. Supp. 2d 443, 446, 448 (E.D. Pa. 
2000) ("Plaintiff is entitled to an award for" $38,780.05, the depletion of money due to ad-
verse tax consequences). Interestingly enough, the 0 'Neill court forgot to account for the 
extra taxes in the gross up itself. Polsky & Befort, supra note 32, at 92 n.I50. However, the 
court did demonstrate sufficient understanding of the process in not ordering a tax supple-
ment for the compensatory and liquidated damages. O'Neill, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 448. See also 
supra Section III.B (taking the stance that punitive damages and other "litigation" damages 
should not be grossed up). 
151. Polsky & Befort, supra note 32, at 92. 
152. O'Neill, 108 F. Supp. 2d at447-48. 
153. Cases concerning bunching and the AMT trap will be intermingled. As Polsky 
and Befort note, "[t]here is no reason to treat adverse tax consequences differently depending 
on the source of th[ ose] consequences. One can debate the basic question of whether gross 
ups are [legal,] ... but it seems to us that ... the answer is the same whether the conse-
quences arise from bunching or the AMT trap." Polsky & Befort, supra note 32, at 97. 
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liability to pay tax on the attorneys' fee award ... were established as a 
matter of law, and if that tax could be calculated with precision, I believe I 
could enter a gross-up order in the exercise of the 'full equitable powers' I 
have [at my disposal]."154 Remarkably, one defendant even found the com-
pensation for negative tax consequences so reasonable that presumably he 
did not contest liability. 155 State courts interpreting laws modeled after fed-
eral anti-discrimination statutes have followed this thinking also.156 
2. Cases Denying Plaintiff-Employee's Tax Raise 
In contrast to the Tenth Circuit, the District of Columbia Circuit has 
taken a strong stance against gross ups. 157 In Dashnaw v. Pefia, the court did 
"not linger long" in rejecting an engineer's request for tax relief in an 
ADEA lawsuit, dismissing his claim in fewer than two sentences. 158 Alt-
hough the Tenth Circuit decided Sears nine years earlier, it appears the D.C. 
Circuit simply disregarded the plaintiff's argument without analyzing any 
existing case law. 159 In 2007, the same court chose not to overturn Dashnaw 
when again confronted with an employee's adverse tax consequences be-
cause of Dashnaw's "binding circuit precedent."160 A perceived absence of 
authority--or possibly an ulterior motive (a "wariness [to tread] on sover-
154. Porter v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., 293 F. Supp. 2d 152, 156 (D. D.C. 2003). 
155. See Gelofv. Papineau, 829 F.2d 452,455-56 (3d Cir. 1987) (remanding back to 
the district court for a redetermination of the tax element of damages because a Delaware 
state official conceded liability on that front). 
156. See Blaney v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Dist. No. 160, 55 
P.3d 1208, 1216-18 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (awarding a gross up when analyzing the Wash-
ington Law Against Discrimination); Ferrante v. Sciaretta, 839 A.2d 993, 995-96 (N.J. Su-
per. Ct. Law Div. 2003) (same, but with New Jersey's Laws Against Discrimination). 
157. One could say that the D.C. Circuit has never gotten too "charged up" over a 
plaintiffs adverse tax consequences. 
158. 12 F.3d 1112, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (per curiam) ("Absent an arrangement by 
voluntary settlement of the parties, the general rule that victims of discrimination should be 
made whole does not support 'gross-ups' ofbackpay to cover tax liability."). However, while 
not following the general rule, the court in Dashnaw does concede the make-whole objective 
of discrimination statutes. !d. The plaintiff claimed that the Federal Maritime Administration 
forced him to retire by promoting younger candidates over him. /d. at 1114-15. The district 
court reinstated Dashnaw and granted back pay, but did not gross up. /d. 
159. Dashnaw's lawyers may have been partially responsible for this result since the 
opinion does state that "appellee points to [no authority for such relief]." !d. at 1116. Clearly, 
however, the D.C. Circuit did not spend much time debating grossing up and its potential 
merits. 
160. Fogg v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 447,450,456 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (not allowing a gross 
up to a United States marshal who worked in a "racially hostile" environment). Rather than 
tackle the issue, Fogg mostly focused on "[t]he district court's failure to consider a facially 
applicable precedent." /d. at 456. The district court originally granted a gross up, citing 
Sears, because the United States Marshal Service did not offer Fogg any of his scheduled pay 
increases. Fogg v. Gonzales, 407 F. Supp. 2d 79, 91(D. D.C. 2005). 
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eign immunity"Y61-prevented the D.C. Circuit from ever considering the 
pros and cons of grossing up, even with more and more courts warming up 
to the idea and Congress mulling over the Civil Rights Tax Relief Act on 
multiple occasions. 162 One district court gave the topic even less thought, 
seemingly acknowledging that a party "is responsible for his own taxes just 
as if he had remained a[n] ... employee" of the defendant. 163 Of course, a 
victorious plaintiff cannot possibly pay his taxes in the same fashion with-
out a gross up. 
One particular case captures the injustice of not relieving a plaintiff of 
his negative tax consequences most shockingly.164 In 2001, Cynthia Spina 
accused a city of sexual discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. 165 At the 
end of her trial, she received a "huge," but short-lived award. 166 The district 
judge ordered a remittitur167 of the damages from $3 million to $300,000, 
causing plaintiff to lose $154,322 of her own money when she had to pay 
income taxes on $1 million in attorneys' fees and costs. 168 The Spina court 
admitted that its "application of the current tax law ... [would] produce an 
'anomalous ... result"'169 and sympathized with the plaintiff's plight: 
"Plaintiff waged a courageous fight for what she believed was just, even 
though other female officers, who felt similarly victimized, lacked the forti-
tude to do so.'mo In praising Spina for standing up to her employer and then 
161. Canney, supra note 32, at 1131. At least one writer believes that both the Dash-
naw and Fogg cases "represent an unwillingness to apply tax gross-ups against the govern-
ment [without) an express waiver of sovereign immunity." !d. (footnote omitted). See also 
supra note 118 and accompanying text (describing how the Eighth Circuit denied a gross up 
because of governmental immunity). The Dashnaw decision can also be attacked as a per 
curiam opinion. 
162. Polsky & Befort, supra note 32, at 82-83, 91-93. 
163. Best v. Shell Oil Co., 4 F. Supp. 2d 770,776 (N.D. Ill. 1998). 
164. The Spina case does not squarely address the legality of adverse tax conse-
quences for bunching because the plaintiff"used the AMT trap as a defense to the claim that 
her award was excessive," not necessarily that she should be entitled to a gross up. Polsky & 
Befort, supra note 32, at 99. Yet, the court leaves no doubt that "plaintiffs tax [predicament 
is] strictly a matter between her and Congress." !d. For more on Congress's duty to fix the 
tax problems inherent in employment suits, see discussion infra Section IV.B (advocating for 
Congress to pass a renewed version of the Civil Rights Tax Relief Act). 
165. Spina v. Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook Cnty., 207 F. Supp. 2d 764, 767 (N.D. Ill. 
2002). 
166. !d. at 769. The "award made headlines in both of Chicago's major newspapers, 
and was featured on several morning television and radio shows." !d. 
167. !d. Plaintiff could have either taken the $300,000 remittitur as compensation for 
emotional distress and damage to her reputation or retried the issue of damages. !d. at 778-
79. 
168. !d. at 776-77. 
169. !d. at 777 (quoting Hukkanen Campbell v. Comm'r, 274 F.3d 1312, 1314 (lOth 
Cir. 2001)). 
170. !d. 
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leaving her to hold the bag, the court cannot be described as anything but 
hypocritical: 
Cynthia Spina dreamt of being a police officer since she was a child; she worked 
hard and sacrificed to realize that dream. By all accounts, Officer Spina is an excel-
lent officer, which makes the District's conduct all the more astounding. Its will-
ingness to sacrifice a good officer instead of addressing serious sexual harassment 
and internal grievance problems reveals an anachronistic attitude that has no place 
in today's law enforcement community. 
Officer Spina presented overwhelming evidence at trial that the District [harassed 
and abused] her .... 
Nevertheless, the Court must conclude that [a gross up should be denied]. 171 
One of the major justifications for the permissibility of gross ups is to meet 
"sound [public] policy ends."172 A void in the Code should not "threaten[] to 
thwart meritorious suits because a highly successful plaintiff runs the risk of 
having [some or] the entire benefit of a judgment eliminated plus incurring 
a substantial tax liability to the [IRS)": 173 
People count on the legal system to protect them and when their civil rights are vi-
olated the system needs to function properly. It is disheartening ... that, in actuali-
ty, ... [he] is going to be taken to the cleaners by the government tax system, and 
as a result, he ends up owing [money out of his wages] to the government for the 
'privilege' of having won his ... case . 
. . . [T]here is something fundamentally wrong with the law when it hurts the peo-
ple it is supposed to protect. 174 
However, the AMT trap and bunching do just this: discourage aggrieved 
plaintiffs from ever bringing suit. Thus, the Code penalizes citizens for 
"do[ing] the [right] thing"175 and maybe even hurts the country. 176 
171. !d. at 778. 
172. Polsky & Befort, supra note 32, at 96 n.l73. 
173. Blaney v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, District No. 160, 55 
P.3d 1208, 1217 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (concerning the Washington Law Against Discrimi-
nation, which is very similar to Title VII). From a tax perspective, the meaning is the same 
for federal anti-discrimination statutes, as plaintiff had to pay $244,753 out of his own sav-
ings. See Blaney v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, District No. 160, 87 
P.3d 757, 760 n.2 (Wash. 2004) (the Washington Supreme Court affirming the lower state 
court); Polsky & Befort, supra note 32, at 97 ("[T]he underlying state laws share the same 
[objectives] as federal ... law."). 
174. 146 CONG. REC. S7163 (daily ed. July 18, 2000) (statement of Sen. Grassley). 
175. !d. 
176. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (containing an epigraph from Andrew 
Mellon). 
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Ill. To "GROSS UP" OR NOT TO "GROSS UP": THE ARGUMENTS ON BOTH 
SIDES 
If Congress takes no further action, then courts' approaches to gross 
ups will vary across the country and depend exclusively on statutory inter-
pretation.177 On the one hand, Congress imposes a civil obligation on citi-
zens, including plaintiffs who recover lost wages and other pecuniary dam-
ages in employment disputes, to pay specified amounts in income tax. 178 On 
the other hand, Congress grants judges broad equitable power to put victori-
ous plaintiffs in the same economic position the employee would have oc-
cupied had no discrimination occurred. 179 Trial and circuit courts will have 
to decide individually "which congressional directive (for the plaintiff to 
pay his own taxes or for the defendant to make the plaintiff economically 
whole)" should take precedence over the other. 180 This section reexamines 
federal anti-discrimination statutes, legislative history, and judicial con-
struction in an effort to declare once and for all that courts do have the legal 
authority to gross up a settlement or jury award. 
A. Justice Trumps Efficiency: Tax Computations Are Not Overly 
Cumbersome 
Since as early as 1939, albeit in a contract case, employers and judges 
have complained that gross ups involve too much guessing and conjec-
ture.181 To compute a plaintiff's negative tax consequences in the employ-
ment context, one needs only to determine his gross income and two sepa-
rate tax rates: (1) the tax rates that would have been applied to the wages 
had the employee earned them normally and (2) the present tax rates. 182 
Without a doubt, this process will entail some speculation, as a multitude of 
unknown factors could affect the plaintiff's tax situation. For example, try-
177. A common adage in statutory interpretation is, "'"[ w ]here there is no clear in-
tention, ... a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one.""' Crawford 
Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 445 (1987) (quoting Radzanower v. Touche 
Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976)). But this begs the question: which provision is "spe-
cific"? A legitimate case could be made for either set of statutes being "specific." Further-
more, the tax and employment statutes do not make any reference to each other. 
178. Polsky & Befort, supra note 32, at I 07. 
179. !d. 
180. /d. Different courts will take different approaches, leading to unpredictable 
outcomes. 
181. See Paris v. Remington Rand, Inc., 101 F.2d 64,68 (2d Cir. 1939) (holding that 
augmenting damages for adverse tax consequences caused by bunching could be too specula-
tive); DePalma v. Westland Software House, 225 Cal. App. 3d 1534, 1544 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1990) (ignoring defendant's argument that plaintiffs damages should be reduced by tax 
benefits because of"the necessarily complex ... nature of inquiring into tax [matters]"). 
182. Polsky & Befort, supra note 32, at 113. 
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ing to calculate an employee's adverse tax consequences may raise several 
questions with impossible-to-know answers: 183 Will the plaintiff marry?184 
Will he be eligible for a dependency deduction185 or other write-offs? Will 
he report income from stock dividends or wages from another job? When 
will he retire? Will tax rates or the Code change? Will inflation rise? Will 
the AMT be triggered? 
These concerns do not extend to back pay, as calculating a plaintiffs 
adverse tax consequences on back pay is fairly straightforward; 186 one only 
has to consult old editions of the Code. Front pay, however, will inevitably 
pose more headaches. In light of the damages courts assess every day, 
though, especially in tort actions,187 this chore does not seem to be too out of 
the ordinary. Courts routinely consider variables, such as life expectancy, 
predicted costs, and anticipated needs, when estimating damages for future 
physical and mental pain, medical expenses, and earning capacity. 188 A 
gross up, like pre-judgment interest and the remedies listed above, are nec-
essary "'element[s] of complete compensation."'189 Even in the employment 
context, judges do not shy away from speculative matters: courts presume 
an award for back pay even though it "encompasses far more than just [an 
employee's] previous salar[y ]," such as "expected tips, lost bonuses, and 
overtime pay."190 Most importantly, tax fairness "[f]rom the Boston Tea 
183. "There is no way of telling what the tax rates will be in the future, nor what 
exemptions, deductions and other income the plaintiff would have, so as to determine what 
tax bracket he would have been in." VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND 
SCHWARTZ'S TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 534 (lith ed. 2005). 
184. See I.R.C. § l(a)-(d) (2006) (listing different tax rates depending on whether 
taxpayer is married). 
185. See id. § 152 (defining a "qualifying child" and a "qualifying relative"). 
186. Note that a trial court has already determined a plaintiffs back pay award when 
calculating negative consequences. Thus, computing a gross up on this amount should not be 
too demanding since all events that would affect plaintiffs income and deductions have 
occurred. 
187. See Anderson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 377 F. Supp. 136, 139 (E.D. La. 1974) 
(assuming that a young bum victim "will be deprived of a normal social life" and "will never 
find a husband and raise a family" because of her deformities). The Anderson court also 
approved a large award for the girl's medical expenses because presumably, she will "need 
the guidance, treatment and counseling of a team of doctors, including plastic surgeons, 
psychiatrists, and sociologists, throughout her lifetime." /d. On this occasion, the district 
court in Louisiana speculated far into the future. 
188. SCHWARTZ, supra note 168, at 547-54. 
189. Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 558 (1988) (quoting West Virginia v. United 
States, 479 U.S. 305,310 (1987)); see also Loesch v. City of Philadelphia, No. 05-CV-0578, 
2008 WL 2557429, at *I 0 (E. D. Pa. June 25, 2008) ("[T]he mere fact that there is an element 
of speculation involved in calculating the taxes that would have been paid on lost wages does 
not provide a sound reason for denying the award." (footnote omitted)). 
190. Canney, supra note 32, at 1117 (footnote omitted). "(B]ackpay compensation 
includes all economic benefits that the plaintiff would have received from the employer, 
whether directly or indirectly, but for the employer's discriminatory conduct." !d. Courts use 
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Party to now ... [has been] firmly parked in the American psyche,"191 -and 
so, efficient tax administration should not be made a priority over consid-
erations of fairness. . 
To overcome any difficulties, plaintiffs should be required to retain 
their own accountants and if necessary, provide prior tax returns. Thus, in 
order to recover for his negative tax consequences, the employee, not the 
court, should bear the burden of proving the specific damage amount. 192 
This expectation seems entirely fair since judges are not in the business of 
computing a person's taxes. However, ignoring a plaintiff's adverse tax 
consequences altogether calls into question the main purpose of the Ameri-
can court system: to administer justice. 
B. Anti-Discrimination Statutes Seek To Compensate and Deter 
Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA all serve to deter discrimination in 
the workplace, achieve "equality of employment opportunities,"193 and 
compensate plaintiffs for any financial and emotional losses caused by the 
employer's illegal behavior. To accomplish these honorable goals, Congress 
vested courts with plenty of leeway. As the Supreme Court said in Bell v. 
Hood, "[W]here federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been 
the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies 
a four-step process for calculating a plaintiff's back pay: (I) determine the plaintiff's proba-
ble employment history absent discrimination, (2) fix the period of time where back pay 
should apply, (3) determine additional pecuniary interests other than lost wages, and (4) 
reduce the award if the plaintiff fails to mitigate the damages. 1 CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & 
LAUREN M. WALTER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND PRACTICE§ 13.09[B][1] (4th 
ed. 2009). 
191. YABLON, supra note 3, at 134 (quoting Congressman Richard Neal). 
192. Eshelman did (predictably) put the burden of proof on the plaintiff. Eshelman v. 
Agere Sys., Inc., 554 F.3d 426,443 (3d Cir. 2009); see also supra note 118 and accompany-
ing text (implying that the Eighth Circuit would allow gross ups if the plaintiff-employee 
introduced evidence on how the district court should calculate his adverse tax consequences). 
District courts in the Third Circuit also require a level of proof. See Argue v. David Davis 
Enters, Inc., No. 02-9521,2009 WL 750197, at *26-27 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2009) (declining a 
gross up because the plaintiff did not provtde "a reliable estimate of the negative income tax 
consequences of his lump sum"); Loesch, 2008 WL 2557429, at *II. Mistakes could occur, 
so courts should require the testimony of an expert on the subject matter, or at least detailed 
accounting computations arriving at the precise figure. However, the burden should not be 
too high. See Canney, supra note 32, at 113 7 ("The burden of proof should rest on the plain-
tiff, not crush her."). This Note assumes that an award for back pay or front pay has already 
been calculated. Thus, evidence regarding the plaintiff's finances will already be in the rec-
ord and accounting principles will have already been applied. In all, only the District of 
Columbia Circuit's decision in Dashnaw justified excluding a gross up for bunching, among 
federal circuit courts, on Title VII grounds. Dashnaw v. Pefia, 12 F.3d 1112, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 
1994) (per curiam). 
193. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975) (quoting Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,429 (1971)). 
200 Michigan State Law Review Vol. 2012:171 
so as to grant the necessary relief."194 Judges "may use any available remedy 
to make good the wrong done."195 Title VII's section on damages, which the 
ADA later incorporated,l 96 reflects this sentiment: courts should redress 
discrimination "as may be appropriate."197 In 1972, Congress expanded Title 
VII's scope to any "equitable relief as the court deems appropriate."198 A 
committee report from the Senate explained the thinking behind the 
amendment: 
[This] Act is intended to make the victims of unlawful discrimination whole, and .. 
. the attainment of this objective rests not only upon [ endmg] the particular unlaw-
ful employment practice ... , but also requires that [plaintiffs] ... be, so far as pos-
sible, restored to a position where they would have been were it not for the unlaw-
ful discrimination. 199 
The ADEA uses almost identicallanguage.200 In addition to compen-
sating plaintiffs, Title VII also incentivizes employees to expose and "root 
out" employment discrimination.201 However, a plaintiff's adverse tax con-
sequences may "inhibit[] the prosecution of some cases or ... fore[ e] [him] 
into a[] ... lowball settlement."202 Only with meaningful and financially 
consequential remedies can the desire to eliminate such discretions be car-
ried out. Thus, all three statutes offer an "arsenal of remedies" to ensure the 
most complete relief possible.203 The only measures not condoned are those 
194. 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) (granting subject matter jurisdiction in a Fourth 
Amendment search and seizure case); see also Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council 
for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 716 (1987) (holding that attorneys' fees and other payments 
should be adjusted according to the economic effects litigation has on monetary awards). 
195. Bell, 327 U.S. at 684. 
196. The ADA has adopted Title VII's remedies. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2006) 
("The powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in [the Civil Rights Act of 1964] shall be 
the powers, remedies, and procedures this subchapter provides to the Commission, to the 
Attorney General, or to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in viola-
tion of any provision of this [Act] .... "). 
197. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L. No. 88-352, § 706(g), 78 Stat. 241, 259-61. 
198. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4, 86 Stat. 
103, 104-07 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2006)). 
199. 118 CONG. REC. S7168 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1972). 
200. Federal "courts shall have jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable relief as 
may be appropriate." 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2006). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 sought to 
"align the ADEA with Title VII." SULLIVAN & WALTER, supra note 190, at§ 13.09[C). 
201. Polsky & Befort, supra note 32, at 106. Tax law can also achieve this purpose. 
See YABLON, supra note 3, at 20 (quoting former Associate Justice Felix Frankfurter, who 
described the Code as not only "a means for raising revenue," but also "a device for regulat-
ing conduct"). 
202. Polsky, supra note 31, at 617 n.l2. Obviously, only plaintiffs aware of adverse 
tax consequences will be discouraged from filing or continuing lawsuits against their em-
ployer: "[U]nknowing victim[s] will still prosecute ... claims[s] only to realize later, ... the 
pernicious effects ... , "!d. at 616 n.8. 
203. Polsky & Befort, supra note 32, at 102; Civil Rights Act of 1990, S. 2104, JOist 
Cong. § 2 (1990); Civil Rights Act of 1990, H.R. 4000, I 0 I st Cong. § 2 ( 1990). Congress has 
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that "frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination .. 
. and making persons whole for injuries" flowing from that unlawful con-
duct.204 
In response, federal courts have taken large strides in actually imple-
menting Congress's wishes, as awards regularly compensate plaintiffs for 
pre-judgment interest and other costs caused by delays in litigation.205 Bear-
ing in mind that Title VII and the ADEA are meant "to restore the employee 
to the [exact same economic] position he or she would have been in," no 
more and no less, adjustments to a plaintiffs award do not always work in 
his favor-and this is how it should be.206 In this vein, liquidated, punitive, 
and other types of damages that arise only out of litigation should not re-
ceive a gross up. The objective is to make the employee whole, not to give 
him a windfall. For instance, courts have increasingly become aware of the 
time value of money, a basic premise in financial accounting that one would 
rather have money now than later. Essentially, pre-judgment interest takes 
care of "the [reality] that the plaintiff [could] not enjoy the use of [his wag-
es] at the time when [he] would have earned them. "207 The flip side is front 
pay: judges must discount awards that look ahead.208 
Title VII law has evolved so far that pre-judgment interest can almost 
be presumed,209 despite the same evidentiary hurdles that adverse tax conse-
since expanded the scope of Title VII even further to "increase the means by which courts 
[can] make victims of discrimination whole." Canney, supra note 32, at 1116; see Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (finding that "additional remedies 
[compensatory and punitive damages] under Federal law are needed to deter unlawful har-
assment and intentional discrimination in the workplace"). 
204. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,421 (1975). 
205. See United States v. City of Warren, Mich., 138 F.3d 1083, 1097 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(overtime pay); Cox v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1562 (lith Cir. 1986) (lost 
vacation, sick pay, and pension benefits); Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 965-
66 (4th Cir. 1985) (replacement insurance); Williams v. Albemarle City Bd. of Educ., 508 
F.2d 1242, 1244 (4th Cir. 1974) (travel and moving expenses for interim employment); 
Jepsen v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 754 F.2d 924, 926-27 (I lth Cir. 1985) (promoting the plain-
tift). 
206. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S 352, 362 (1995). Courts 
should consider all pecuniary burdens and benefits, such as missed deductions and tax cred-
its. See Canney, supra note 32, at 1136, n.222 ("The goal of tax gross-ups is to completely 
offset the negative tax burden; that is, to tax the award year's gross income ... and end up 
with the same after-tax amount as if the plaintiff had continued working, was taxed yearly at 
the 'normal' rate, and stockpiled earnings."). 
207. Polsky & Befort, supra note 32, at 105. 
208. See Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 82 F.3d 615,622 (5th Cir. 1996) (applying a 
below-market discount rate in calculating the present value of employee's lost future wages). 
209. The House of Representatives Committee on Education and Labor declared that 
an award for pre-judgment interest is entirely practical: 
[A]s a general rule, successful plaintiffs in civil actions who receive monetary re-
lief-back pay as well as attorneys' fees-are entitled to prejudgment interest on 
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quences present.210 Although Title VII does not explicitly mention pre-
judgment interest, courts have taken it upon themselves to fit it into the stat-
ute's "make-whole" scheme.211 In fact, many appellate courts will find an 
abuse of discretion if a trial judge does not include pre-judgment interest.212 
In other words, pre-judgment interest does not require the unusual or limited 
circumstances that Sears calls for with adverse tax consequences and since 
both concepts more accurately return a plaintiff to the economic status quo, 
time-value-of-money reasoning can easily be analogized to that of adverse 
tax consequences.213 "Restorative justice" demands, then, that "interest-
informed" courts also become "tax-informed courts."214 After reading 
Eshelman, Sears, and the hypotheticals in Part I as proof, grossing up is 
definitely possible-both from a mathematical standpoint and a common 
sense one. Without acknowledging a plaintiffs negative tax consequences, 
courts may leave an employee not only incomplete, but empty (emotionally) 
as well: "The tax system touches more people ... than any other part of the 
government" and "[t]he loss of confidence in its integrity is the loss of con-
fidence in the government itself."215 
such relief to compensate recipients for the delay in payment. The principle is a 
simple one: money received later is worth less than money received now. 
H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. I, at 75 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 623. For the 
almost unanimous availability of pre-judgment interest, see Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 
557 (1988) ("(A]pparently all the United States Courts of Appeals ... [confronted with the 
issue believe] that Title VII authorizes prejudgment interest."); Conway v. Electro Switch 
Corp., 825 F.2d 593,602 (1st Cir. 1987); Green v. USX Corp., 843 F.2d 1511, 1530 (3d Cir. 
1988); United States v. Gregory, 818 F.2d 1114, 1118 (4th Cir. 1987); Parson v. Kaiser 
Aluminum & Chern. Corp., 727 F.2d 473,478 (5th Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Wooster Brush Co. 
Emps. Relief Ass'n, 727 F.2d 566, 578-79 (6th Cir. 1984); Taylor v. Philips Indus., Inc., 593 
F.2d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 1979); Washington v. Kroger Co., 671 F.2d 1072, 1078 (8th Cir. 
1982) ("The defendant is, by hypothesis, the wrongdoer, and has had the use of plaintiff's 
money for years."); Domingo v. New England Fish Co., 727 F.2d 1429, 1446 (9th Cir. 
1984); Nagy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 773 F.2d 1190, 1192-93 (lith Cir. 1985); Anthony E. 
Rothschild, Comment, Prejudgment Interest: Survey and Suggestion, 77 NW. U. L. REv. 192 
(1982) (revealing how pre-judgment awards are commonplace). Just as Title VII permits pre-
judgment interest awards, gross ups are also manifested in Congress's make-whole intent. 
210. Pre-judgment "calculations are often complex and require submissions from 
economic experts." Canney, supra note 32, at 1118 (citing Plaintiff's Motion to Mold Ver-
dict to Include Prejudgment Interest & Damages Resulting from Tax Consequences at Ex. A, 
Eshelman v. Agere Sys., Inc. No. Civ. A. 03-CV-1814 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 2005) ("including 
an affidavit from a forensic expert to compute pre-judgment interest on Eshelman's 
award")). 
211. Canney, supra note 32, at 1118. 
212. Sharkey v. Lasmo, 214 F.3d 371,375 (2d Cir. 2000). 
213. Polsky & Befort, supra note 32, at 105. Courts should endorse tht; same logic 
put forward for pre-judgment interest in accepting gross ups. 
214. Id. at 103, 106. 
215. YABLON, supra note 3, at 93 (quoting former IRS Chief Counsel B. John Wil-
liams). A law code that does not appeal to a common sense of fairness will cause citizens in a 
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C. Pre-Tax Dollars Versus After-Tax Dollars: Does It Matter? 
To justify not grossing up, courts sometimes liken a plaintiffs adverse 
tax consequences to his attorneys' fees under the classic "American 
Rule": 216 Just as a litigant arranges a private agreement with his lawyers, a 
plaintiff-employee's taxes are purely a matter between him and the IRS.217 
The Second Restatement of Torts supports this "tax-blind" position, namely 
that courts should not concern themselves with after-tax dollars.218 However, 
the Supreme Court has highlighted how detrimental to a plaintiff this tech-
nique can be: 
The amount of money that a wage earner is able to contribute to ... [himself and] 
his family is unquestionably affected by the amount of ... tax he must pay to the 
Federal Government. It is his after-tax income, rather than his gross income before 
taxes, that provides the only realistic measure of his ... [net income). It follows in-
exorably that the wage earner's iricome tax is a relevant factor .... 219 
Moreover, Congress has not been afraid to ignore the American rule 
when appropriate, as the fee-shifting provisions that entitle prevailing plain-
tiffs in civil rights cases to attorneys' fees are "a deliberate departure from 
the usual American [rule] that each party must bear [his] own legal costs. "220 
This notion-that "income tax consequences ... [should be] of no relevance 
in personal injury litigation"221-is therefore, inherently flawed, especially 
in cases where attorneys' fees are already waived. 
IV. A LACK OF CONSISTENCY IN FEDERAL CASE LAW LEAVES EMPLOYERS 
AND EMPLOYEES UNSURE WHEN TO EXPECT A "GROSS UP" 
Unlike the widespread acceptance that pre-judgment interest has 
gained among courts, tax gross ups still have a long way to go. This Note 
takes the position that appellate courts should not only show deference to a 
trial judge's decision to gross up, but should also pressure lower courts to 
democratic country to lose faith in their government. A plaintiff may feel like the court did 
not vindicate him or truly appreciate his plight. 
216. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) 
(explaining that, unless a statute has a fee-shifting provision, each party must pay for his own 
legal representation). 
217. Polsky & Befort, supra note 32, at 110. 
218. "The amount of an award of tort damages is not augmented or diminished be-
cause of the fact that the award is or is not subject to taxation." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS§ 914A (1979). 
219. Norfolk v. W. Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 493-94 (I 980). 
220. Sager & Cohen, supra note 38, at 1076. 
221. Rodriguez v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 151 Cal. Rptr. 399, 420 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2d 1978). 
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make grossing up the rule, not the exception.222 Congress has consistently 
expressed its intention that courts broadly interpret discrimination statutes in 
all employment disputes:223 "Title VII authorizes the award of interest or 
other compensation for delay in payment of back pay and attorneys' fees in 
actions against private employers as well as state and local governments."224 
However, judges have not taken the hint, leaving uncertainty over a court's 
ability to gross up, over the application of governmental immunity, and over 
the magnitude of adverse tax consequences to fester. With the goal of elimi-
nating negative tax consequences in mind, the Third Circuit fell short: 
Eshelman is merely a ')umping-off' point in achieving the full equality that 
Congress reserved for mistreated employees. To accelerate the process, 
Congress has to reiterate one more time that anti-discrimination statutes 
should make the plaintiff-employee completely whole and not just "whole" 
to the satisfaction of the court.225 
A. Despite the Praise Eshelman May Receive, the Third Circuit Left Nu-
merous Questions Unanswered 
Even with Eshelman and Sears, employers and employees in the Third 
and Tenth Circuits, not to mention circuits that have not spoken on the issue 
of adverse tax consequences, will still wonder whether a particular district 
judge in his or her own case will allow for a gross up.226 Although most 
plaintiffs bringing employment discrimination claims suffer negative tax 
consequences, Eshelman, like earlier courts, limited its holding, resisting the 
urge to establish a presumption of a tax gross up.227 Rather, according to 
Eshelman, courts have the option to increase a judgment, based on a case-
by-case analysis,228 and most troubling, the Third Circuit's gross up only 
addressed a fraction of Eshelman's adverse tax consequences.229 Clearly, the 
222. Even advocates of gross ups only feel that courts should consider a plaintiff's 
adverse tax consequences when the employee's unique situation demands grossing up. 
223. See supra Section III.B (showing how Congress did not intend to tie the hands 
of federal courts); H.R. REP. No. 101-644, pt., at I, 84-85 (1990) ("Departure from the estab-
lished rules of statutory construction, such as the rule favoring broad construction of civil 
rights laws, interferes with the ability of Congress to express its will through legislation."). 
224. H.R. REP. No. 101-644, pt. I, at 48-49 (1990)(emphasis added). 
225. The legislature has no obligation "to the courts, but to the people by whom its 
members are elected." Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. 533, 548 (1869). 
226. Ironically, only cases in the D.C. Circuit are cut-and-dry, yet hopefully, this 
Note highlights the unfairness and bare reasoning in the Dashnaw precedent. 
227. Eshelman v. Agere Sys., Inc., 554 F.3d 426, 443 {3d Cir. 2009). 
228. !d. Compare id., with Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421-22 
(1975) (presuming an award for back pay whenever a plaintiff-employee is successful on the 
merits). 
229. The $6,893 upgrade did not cover all of Eshelman's adverse tax consequences. 
Eshelman, 554 F.3d at 442-43. 
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argument for grossing up is strongest when litigation has been protracted 
and the size of the lump sum significant. But should an innocent plaintiff 
with a less than titanic tax burden still have to foot the bill? 
_ Without a guaranteed gross up, litigants will hesitate before settling. 
No one disputes that when employees face discrimination and other viola-
tions of their civil rights, it is best if they can avoid litigation by coming to 
amicable agreements with their employers. Settling will ensure that courts 
are more efficient and do not get flooded with cases that could have been 
resolved months before. However, ambiguity over the IRS's treatment of 
discrimination awards makes settlement agreements with employers ex-
tremely difficult. Both employers and employees take tax liability into ac-
count when exchanging settlement figures and thus, the difference between 
including or not including tax damages can act as a serious impediment to 
resolving cases early on or at all. 230 Moreover, a plaintiff's adverse tax con-
sequences may contribute, along with the stress and distraction of litigation, 
to a valid claim being dropped altogether. 
Procedural problems also present themselves. The Third Circuit did 
not address the tax implications of front pay, nor did it decide whether an 
employee can recover from a government-employer.231 Furthermore, 
Eshelman ignored the impact of adverse tax consequences on jury instruc-
tions. Should juries be told to disregard tax issues?232 If not, could plaintiff 
enjoy a double recovery?233 Finally, do tax gross ups violate the Seventh 
Amendment's prohibition on additur?234 The flaws in the Eshelman decision 
230. Uncertainty surrounding negative tax consequences could raise or lower the 
costs of settlement. Polsky, supra note 31, at 617 n.l2. As a result, both employees and 
employers get hurt. See Advocacy: Civil Rights Tax Relief Act, NELA, 
http://www.nela.org/NELA/index.cfm?event=showPage&pg=CRTRA (last visited Sept. 5, 
2011) (outlining how the Civil Rights Tax Relief Act of2007 would have benefitted employ-
ers, employees, and the court system). 
231. See Library of Cong. v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 314-15 (holding that unless the 
United States expressly and unequivocally waives its sovereign immunity, it is not liable for 
pre-judgment interest or other awards authorized by discrimination statutes). 
232. See BRUCE A. FREDERICKSON, GEO. U. L. CENTER CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., 
TAXATION, BACK PAY, AND ATTORNEYS' FEES IN EMPLOYMENT CASES 3 (2003), available at 
2003 WL 22002094 (arguing that courts should instruct juries on the adverse tax effects of 
lump-sum awards). 
233. Chad L. Staller & Stephen M. Dripps, Damages: A Tax Break for Plaintiffs 
Raises Interesting Issues, 17 No.7 EMP. L. STRATEGIST I (2009). 
234. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 393 U.S. 474, 482 (1935) (forbidding federal courts from 
increasing the amount of damages awarded by a jury in personal injury actions). The Seventh 
Amendment reads: 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dol-
lars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be 
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the 
rules of the common law. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
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should not take away from its merits. However, the case, while serving as a 
step in the right direction, demonstrates that courts are slow, unpredictable, 
and extremely reticent to attack issues not directly in front of them. In the 
meantime, as courts either overlook the negative tax consequences or reach 
inconsistent results, hundreds of plaintiffs will suffer a two-fold injury: one 
for improper behavior on the part of the employer and another for judicial 
and congressional negligence. 
B. Congressional Action Is Needed To Reinforce the "Make-Whole" Objec-
tive of Title VII and Other Statutes 
Determining after-tax income can be a somewhat painstaking and 
lackluster endeavor.235 Therefore, courts are typically "reluctant to get their 
hands dirty with tax law if they can avoid it."236 Former Associate Justice 
Harry Blackrnun once joked that "[i]f [a United States Supreme Court Jus-
tice is] in the doghouse with the Chief[Justice], he gets the crud[,] ... the 
tax cases .... "237 This unwillingness to delve into federal tax matters can 
usually be blamed on a lack of explicit legislative authorization: "If Con-
gress wanted to impose an extra tax on defendants [liable] for unlawful dis-
crimination, then Congress would have ... made clear its intention ... [to] 
shift[] part of plaintiffs tax [liability] to the defendant. "238 As the argument 
goes, "Congress, not [federal or state courts], must correct any shortcom-
ings" or inequities in the Code.239 Other courts have shared their same view-
point/40 putting the impetus on Congress to take charge and241 show that this 
235. See Spitz, supra note 25, at 447 ("I realize that the 'tax implications of nonphys-
ical personal injury loss for plaintiffs' is not a sexy topic .... "); Polsky, supra note 31, at 
637 ("[Adverse tax consequences have become] a pervasive nuisance for tax practitioners 
and federal judges .... "). 
236. Polsky & Befort, supra note 32, at 70; see also Shott v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. 
Luke's Med. Ctr., 338 F.3d 736, 744 (7th Cir. 2003) ([L]itigation already places a 'heavy 
burden' on the federal courts; adding a requirement to calculate the tax status of the parties 
would only increase that burden."). 
237. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1986, at Bl4 (quoting 
Justice Blackmun). Other Justices on the Supreme Court have made similar remarks. When a 
reporter asked former Associate Justice David Souter why he sang along with the Chief 
Justice at the Court's annual Chri_strnas party, Justice Souter replied, "I have to. Otherwise I 
get all the tax cases." BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE REHNQUIST 
COURT 8 (1996). 
238. Polsky & Befort, supra note 32, at I 08. 
239. Campbell v. Comm'r, 274 F.3d 1312, 1315 (lOth Cir. 2001). For a humorous 
reiteration of this belief, see YABLON, supra note 3, at 62 (quoting Dave Barry: "The ques-
tion is: What can we, as citizens, do to reform our tax system? As you know, under our three-
branch system of government the tax laws are created by: Satan. But he works through the 
Congress, so that's where we must focus our efforts."). 
240. See McLaughlin v. Union-Leader Corp., 127 A.2d 269, 273 (N.H. 1956) (claim-
ing that gross ups "should be sought at the source-in federal legislation"). 
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country is "committed to horizontal and vertical equity" in tax law242-and 
equality in society at large: 
[America's] tax system suffers from delay in getting the final word in judicial re-
view, from retroactivity of the decision when it is obtained, and from the lack of a 
roundly tax-informed viewpoint of judges .... 
Judicial efforts to mold tax policy by isolated decisions make a national tax system 
difficult to develop, administer, or observe.Z43 
Beginning in 2000, Congressmen and Senators have made repeated at-
tempts to help a plaintiff-employee cope with any adverse tax consequences 
he may experience with bunching.244 However, all the bills have failed be-
cause the Committee on Ways and Means, one of the oldest House commit-
tees charged with the duty of writing tax legislation and bills affecting So-
cial Security, Medicare, and other entitlement programs, has quickly 
dropped them from the agenda.245 On June 25, 2009, John Lewis (D-GA) 
and James Sensenbrenner (R-WI) re-introduced the Civil Rights Tax Relief 
Act (CRTRA) to the House of Representatives.246 H.R. 3035 sought "to ex-
clude from gross income amounts received on account of claims based on 
certain unlawful discrimination and to allow income averaging for backpay 
and frontpay awards received on account of such claims."247 
This bill too did not pass.248 Law review articles, the Internet, and oth-
er sources offer little insight into why these bills have been overlooked. 249 
241. Congress has "to act responsibly and finally fix this mess." Polsky, supra note 
31, at 618 (footnote omitted). 
242. Spitz, supra note 25, at 447. 
243. YABLON, supra note 3, at 191, 198 (quoting former Associate Justice Robert H. 
Jackson). 
244. Only minor modifications have been made. See Civil Rights Tax Fairness Act of 
2000, H.R. 4570, 106th Cong. (2000) (amending the Code "to exclude from gross income 
amounts received on account of claims based on certain unlawful discrimination and to allow 
income averaging for backpay and frontpay awards received on account of such claims"); 
Civil Rights Tax Relief Act of 2001, H.R. 840, 107th Cong. (2001) (same as Civil Rights 
Tax Fairness Act); Civil Rights Tax Relief Act of 2003, H.R. 1155, 108th Cong. (2003) 
(same); Civil Rights Tax Relief Act of 2007, H.R. 1540, !lOth Cong. (2007) (same). Very 
similar Senate bills proposed a few months after the House bills can be found at Search 
Legislation in Congress, GovTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billsearch.xpd 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2011). 
245. See, e.g., Advocacy: Civil Rights Tax Relief Act, NELA, 
http://www.nela.org/NELA/index.cfm?event=showPage&pg=CRTRA (last visited Sept. 5, 
2011). 
246. See Civil Rights Tax Relief Act of 2009, H.R. 3035, Ill th Cong. (2009). Two 
senators, Jeff Bingaman (D-NM) and Susan Collins (R-ME), presented a practically identical 
bill to the Senate. Civil Rights Tax Relief Act of2009, S. 1360, I lith Cong. (2009). 
247. Civil Rights Tax Relief Act of2009, H.R. 3035, !lith Cong. (2009). 
248. On October 13, 2012, the same two congressmen presented the newest version 
of the CRTRA to the !12th Congress. Civil Rights Tax Relief Act of 20 II, H.R. 3195, !12th 
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This Note thus proposes an enhanced CRTRA that would (1) make non-
economic damages in civil rights cases non-taxable,250 (2) tax lump-sum 
awards at the correct marginal tax rates or actually force the defendant to 
gross up,251 and (3) repeal double taxation of attorneys' fees. Most of the 
bills previously presented would have averaged the back pay or front pay 
awards.252 However, as the Sears case revealed, income-averaging provi-
sions will not always alleviate a plaintiff of his negative tax consequenc-
es.253 Since no rational reason can be given why an employee should not be 
fully reimbursed, this "new-and-improved CRTRA" would always elimi-
nate a plaintiffs adverse tax consequences. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States holds itself out as a beacon of freedom, striving to 
put every person (male/female, white/black, Catholic/Protestant, etc.) before 
the law equally. In pursuing this goal, Congress passed a number of anti-
discrimination statutes, preventing employers from firing workers based on 
sex, race, and disabilities. Discrimination is "an invidious practice that 
causes grave harm to its victims"254 and the law, especially the Code, is a 
"government's most effective device for modifying behaviorm55 : "Taxes 
Con g. (20 11 ). See also Civil Rights Tax Relief Act of 20 II, S. I 781, !12th Con g. (20 11 ). 
Based on the CR TRA' s history, both bi lis stand little chance of ever being enacted. 
249. All of the CRTRA-related bills have had some bi-partisan support. See 
GovTRACK H.R. 3035, supra note 36 (listing nine Republican and twenty-eight Democrat 
Congressmen who co-sponsored the bill with Rep. Lewis). Also, tens of associations and 
organizations have shown support for the bill. See Advocacy: Civil Rights Tax Relief Act, 
NELA, http://www.nela.org/temp/ts _ 61 OE300E-BDB9-50CE-F493B784BDA564C761 OE 
30 I E-BDB9-50CE-F I FF8D50F4C68591/EndorsersST A TEMENTOFSUPPORTofCRTRA 
3408.pdf (last visited Nov. I, 2011) (listing the American Bar Association, NAACP Legal 
Defense and Education Fund, and American Civil Liberties Union, among others, as signing 
a statement of support for the CRTRA of2007). 
250. Thus, back pay, front pay, and punitive damages should still be taxed. 
251. The latter part of (2) would actually pr~vide a disincentive for employers to 
engage in unlawful discharge or employment discrimination. 
252. See supra note 244 and accompanying text (finding that the Civil Rights Tax 
Fairness Act of 2000 and its progeny would all average income for plaintiffs in successful 
discrimination claims). 
253. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (bringing attention to the fact that 
income averaging would not have helped the plaintiffs in Sears and also citing to authority 
calling for an end to income averaging). 
254. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 238 (1992). 
255. Ernest S. Christian & Gary A. Robbins, Tax Policy: A Behavioral Science, CTR. 
FOR STRATEGIC TAX REFORM, http://www.cstr.org/commentaries/taxreform/taxnotes-
040306.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2011). 
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send messages," "mak[ing] statements about the relative desirability of dif-
ferent types of activity and patterns of conduct."256 
The Supreme Court, in its seminal decision on a district court's equi-
table judgment, Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, argued that Title VII and 
other anti-discrimination statutes serve to "mak[ e] persons whole for inju-
ries suffered through past discrimination" and abrogate "discrimination 
throughout the economy."257 At the heart of congressional intent was to give 
Title VII liberal construction to do just this.258 However, the Code, as pres-
ently written, undermines Title VII's and the ADA's very objective: to put a 
victim in the exact same financial position he would have enjoyed had no 
wrongdoing occurred. Only by shifting the burden of adverse tax conse-
quences to the more politically savvy and deep-pocketed defendants can tax 
gross ups finally produce the long awaited legislative solution.259 
In the words of one district court, '"[i]t's not how much you make, it 
is how much you keep. '"260 With the law as it is, courts can deprive prevail-
ing plaintiffs, who have already suffered humiliation and economic loss at 
the hands of their employer, of funds they deserve. Too often judges refuse 
to shift a portion, let alone the entirety, of plaintiff's elevated tax liability to 
defendants, whose unlawful conduct-it must be emphasized-necessitated 
the lawsuit in the first place. Ironically, statutes meant to protect citizens 
frequently penalize them. With courts tending to treat tax issues in non-tax 
cases like the bubonic plague-and the few that have dared to compute 
gross ups have been at odds-the onus should be on Congress to fix the 
problem.261 
256. YABLON, supra note 3, at 51 (quoting Edward J. McCaffery and Richard E. 
Wagner). 
257. 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1973). Albemarle Paper granted back pay and pre-judgment 
interest awards to African Americans who alleged discrimination. I d. at 409, 436. 
258. Canney, supra note 32, at 1115. 
259. Polsky & Befort, supra note 32, at 70. Employees bringing discrimination suits 
"lack sufficient political coordination and muscle to stimulate Congress to act." Id. at 120. 
Therefore, Polsky encourages "politically adept trial lawyers" to put pressure on Congress to 
pass the CRTRA or a derivative of it. Polsky, supra note 31, at 618. A federal judge in Geor-
gia underscores the helplessness of plaintiff-employees: 
Nowhere is the federal government's mighty hand felt more directly than when the 
Internal Revenue Service comes calling with a demand for unpaid taxes. Taxation, 
admittedly a necessary element of any form of civilized government, places unpar-
alleled power in the hand of the sovereign. When that power is unleashed in an in-
consistent, threatening, and arrogant manner, the powerless taxpayer, who for all 
practical purposes is at the mercy of the government, has little recourse to remedy 
such abuses. 
YABLON, supra note 3, at 217. 
260. O'Neill v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 108 F. Supp. 2d 443, 447 (E.D. Pa. 2000) 
(quoting a television advertisement). 
261. See Reece, supra note 96, at 342 ("[L]egislative response to this issue is over-
due."). 
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The solution is simple: amend the Code.262 Congress has repeatedly re-
formed Title VII and other discrimination statutes263 '"to provide more ef-
fective deterrence and adequate compensation. "'264 One step remains. The 
chronic decisions not to pass the CRTRA have left (and continue to leave) 
gaping holes in the United States' anti-discrimination statutes. Only enact-
ment can preserve the dignity of federal civil rights law, "restore [employ-
ees]-as best as possible-to their rightful place in society,"265 and fill this 
void. 
262. To fix the adverse tax consequence problem, the legislature, as usual, does not 
need to make drastic changes to the Code: 
Legislative changes in tax policy usually begin as marginal adjustments to the ex-
isting tax structure .... The tax code offers a variety of easily grasped levers. In 
this sense, it is an incrementalist paradise, susceptible and seductive to political 
tinkerers. As a result, most changes in tax bills consist of simple adjustments in ex-
isting tax provisions. 
JOHN F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 244-45 
(I 985). 
263. See generally Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 
(1991); Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009); ADA 
Amendments Act of2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008); Older Workers Bene-
fit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990). 
264. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at I (1991). Tax laws have also "never ... been 
static. Experience, changing needs, changing philosophies inevitably produce constant 
change in each." Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U.S. 90, 97 (1939). 
265. Canney, supra note 32, at 1137. 
